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ABSTRACT
Identifying Critical Risk Factors in the Decision-Making Process of Angel Investors
and Venture Capitalists: A Delphi Research Study
by
Shawn A. Carson
Entrepreneurs perceive and manage risk differently than investors (Palich & Bagby, 1995). As a
result, entrepreneurs may underestimate the extent to which their ventures are perceived to be
risky by a potential investor. Consequently, the entrepreneur is left with making assumptions that
could be detrimental in obtaining the necessary capital to launch and grow the business. The
purpose of this study was to determine if there is a common set of perceived critical risk factors
among a group of experienced investors that would cause them to reject a deal out of hand.

The research methodology chosen for this study was the Delphi Technique, which consisted of
three rounds of surveys with a group of 18 experienced Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists.
The process identified 82 critical risk factors across 7 categories. Over half of these factors were
rated between ‘Important’ and ‘Critically Important’ at a consensus rate of greater then 70%.
Each participant reported an average of 11 critical risk factors, yet they rated more than 40 as
‘Important’ or ‘Critically Important’, suggesting there are conscious and subconscious factors
involved in the decision process. Subjective factors such as relationship were rated with higher
importance than more objective measurable factors such as revenue or market share. Venture
Capitalists, as a group, had higher rates of consensus than the Angel Investors and there were
distinct differences between each group regarding which factors are most important.

The study is significant because it rated subjective based factors along with objective factors
2

showing that investors tend to place more importance on trust and relationship building in the
early stages of the investment process. The study also provided a framework for understanding
the complexity of investment decision-making for the benefit of investors, entrepreneurs, and
those who educate and mentor entrepreneurs. Finally, the study is significant for helping
entrepreneurs understand the differences in perspective between Angel Investors and Venture
Capitalists.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship is hard. It is hard for many reasons but principally, it is hard because
for a specific business idea, in a specific place and time, no one has ever done it before. Previous
experience does not guarantee success and there are no roadmaps with specific directions to
bring one to a destination. Research in entrepreneurship is still in its infancy and the rapid pace
of change makes it difficult to find common formulas. But some do exist and more are coming.
This study was about developing a framework to help entrepreneurs understand risk from the
perspective of potential investors, which can be used in the development of a company
presentation and increase the odds of securing funding.
The genesis of this dissertation resulted from a career in assisting entrepreneurs to
prepare for the task of raising capital from investors. After observing hundreds of interactions
between entrepreneurs and investors in a number of settings, one thing became clear; it is
complicated, time consuming, and usually ends in frustration. The process centers around
predicting the future with very little information and a high degree of uncertainty. The operative
word is risk. But such a simple word carries an endless opportunity for interpretation and
observation in so many different contexts.
Entrepreneurship has many definitions. Some people associate entrepreneurship with
starting businesses. Other definitions involve the assumption of risk. One that is quite suitable
for this study was proposed by Barringer and Ireland (2016). They defined entrepreneurship as
“the process by which individuals pursue opportunities without regard to resources they currently
control for the purpose of exploiting future goods and services” (p.7). A common scenario might
be one where a person observes a problem and conceives a solution. This entrepreneur must find
people, materials, skills, services, and processes; not only to develop a prototype, but to also
12

launch a business entity. All of this eventually takes money to accomplish, which is yet another
resource, usually outside the control of the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs must attract enough capital to launch a business, develop a product or
service, convince customers to buy it, and build out the company so the business can grow to
meet the demand. Those who are lucky enough to generate revenue early can grow the company
organically or fuel growth with profits based on the company’s sales. But for many, the cost to
start the business is very high. Patent costs can run over $15,000 (Quinn, 2015). Business
registration and legal documentation can run $5,000 - $6,000 (Shulga, 2014). Website
development can run from $7,000 to over $250,000 (Parr, 2016). Franchise fees range from tens
of thousands to $100,000 or more (Libava, 2017). To open a McDonald’s restaurant, one needs
a half million dollars in cash, and the total investment is between $1 and $2.2 million
(Daszkowski, 2017). For most startups, the funding to launch the business is found from
personal assets and those of friends and family. But for many, the cost far exceeds those
resources.
Entrepreneurs who find themselves in capital intensive ventures often seek funding from
investors who provide cash in return for an equity ownership position in the company, and the
expectation of a huge return. There are two types of investors that were researched in this study;
Angels and Venture Capitalists. Angels are wealthy individuals who invest their own money in
startups (Greathouse, 2012; Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & Sarasvathy, 2009). Venture Capitalists, or
VC’s, invest third party funds in early stage startups (Greathouse, 2012). The Angel Resource
Institute (2016) reported the median angel investor deal in 2016 was $950,000; a substantial
increase from $510,000 in 2014. The odds of getting an investment were about 3%. Hudson
(2016) reported there were over 71,000 deals in 2016 in the US. We can extrapolate there were
just under 2.4 million entrepreneurs seeking investment funding from investors in 2016.
13

The process of raising capital is arduous. The entrepreneur must assemble a PowerPoint
slide presentation and set about presenting it anywhere and everywhere from pitch competitions
to dozens of private meetings. The content of these presentations has long been formulaic.
Kawasaki (2004) proposed the famous 10/20/30 rule, which is basically 10 slides in 20 minutes,
and nothing smaller than a 30-point font. This became a standard for many who coach and
mentor entrepreneurs (Kawasaki, 2014; Yekutiel, 2014; Conrad, 2015). The result was a
standard and efficient script however it lacked basic elements of good storytelling and could
leave potential investors with the perception of a lack of legitimacy in the new venture (Garud,
Schildt, & Lant, 2014).
The audience for these presentations is the investor community and they care about
making a return. They are putting their money at risk and it is their desire to understand and
evaluate that risk in order to make their investment decisions. The idea that entrepreneurs are
risk takers is a commonly held belief. However, Palich and Bagby (1995) proposed that
entrepreneurs are not necessarily predisposed toward risk any more than anyone else. They
tended to frame an opportunity in context of achieving a positive outcome. Investors, on the
other hand, sought to manage their risk by applying an analytically intense process commonly
known as due diligence, but that process is time consuming and expensive. In order to filter
interesting opportunities worthy of due diligence, investors tended to rely on more subjective
measures. Wiltbank, Read, Dew, and Sarasvathy (2007) proposed that investors used a dual set
of risk mitigation strategies: predictive (analytical) and control (personal experience). They
found that control strategies tended to experience fewer failures than the predictive strategies.
Investors too, it seems, deploy a certain amount of decision making based on their gut. But what
we have is a gap between perspectives.
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Statement of the Problem
Palich and Bagby (1995) indicated that entrepreneurs perceive, process, and manage risk
differently than investors. As a result, entrepreneurs may underestimate or disregard the extent
to which their ventures are perceived to be risky in the eye of a potential investor. This may lead
the entrepreneur to fail to incorporate risk mitigation strategies during the formation of their
business plans and company narratives. However, with little or no insight into how investors
perceive and identify risks, the entrepreneur is left with making assumptions that could be
detrimental to obtaining the necessary capital to launch and grow the business. The purpose of
this Delphi study was to determine if there is a common set of perceived critical risk factors
among a group of experienced investors that could cause them to reject a deal out of hand.
Research Questions
1. To what extent are critical risk factors involved in the decision-making process of
investors in considering an investment?
2. Which critical risk factors (execution, market, technological, financial, regulatory, etc.)
do investors consider to be common among most investment decisions?
3. Of these most common critical risk factors, what is the relative weight of importance
among them?
4. What differences occur among the critical risk factors between Angel investors and
Venture Capitalists?
Significance of the Study
This study is significant to entrepreneurs directly because many identify specific risk
categories for developing themes of risk mitigation strategies. A set of weighted risk categories
may form a framework with which to compare strategic and tactical elements and to help
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identify weaknesses in the business plan. This framework will help strengthen the company
narrative to better communicate value to investors, stakeholders, and for marketing purposes.
The study may also be significant to investors, especially as they organize into
investment groups, to determine the overall investment profile and preferences of the investors,
and to better communicate to potential entrepreneurs these characteristics.
Finally, this study may be significant to the educators, mentors, and coaches who provide
guidance and advise to entrepreneurs. The critical risk factors identified in this study may
provide a logical framework for these advisors and educators to teach entrepreneur how to
increase the odds of winning an investment.
Limitations and Delimitations
Inherent in the Delphi approach is the selection of experts who possess sufficient
experience and expertise to offer insight into their investment decision making process. This
study will be delimited to the subset of investors who are identified as experts for the purposes of
this study. The following set of criteria were developed to determine the participants in the study:


Five or more years’ experience in equity investing. This length of time is considered
necessary to have seen a large number of deals across a wide range of potential markets.
It is also important for enough deals to have matured or concluded in failure so the
investor has a sense of what worked and what failed.



A minimum of 10 investments. Higgins (2008) found that 20 – 30% of investment deals
provide a significant return and roughly the same amount utterly fail. The remainder
provide only a moderate return. A minimum of 10 investments insures enough
experience to witness these odds come to fruition.



Primary decision-making authority. Some investors invest through groups or through
funds, where the decisions are usually made through majority vote of the group. Having
16

primary decision-making authority means the investor can act independently on his or her
own set of decision criteria.
This study will be further delimited to investors located in the states of Tennessee,
Kentucky, Ohio, and Georgia. This region represents the majority of investment sources
available to most startups located in the area. The region is also where the researcher has direct
access to the population of investors from which to recruit for the study through personal
networks and professional associations.
The delimitation to the southeastern US creates a limitation based on economic and
industry perceptions of the investors. Average investments in the region tend to be about 75% of
those in California and there is a strong preference on the coasts for software and life science
companies (Angel Resource Institute, 2016). As a result, entrepreneurs may face a different set
of critical risk factors as they seek funding outside the region.
Definition of Terms
1. Entrepreneurship - the process by which individuals pursue opportunities without regard
to resources they currently control for the purpose of exploiting future goods and services
(Barrenger & Ireland, 2016, p. 13).
2. Angel Investors (Angels) - wealthy individuals who invest their own money in startups
(Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & Sarasvathy, 2009; Greathouse, 2012).
3. Venture Capitalists (VC’s) – individuals who invest third party funds in early stage
startups (Greathouse, 2012).
4. Relationship Risk - the risk that an entrepreneur may not make the same decisions when
spending the investor’s money as the investor would (Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque,
2011).
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5. Agency Risk - the characteristics of the entrepreneur, principally where the interests of
the entrepreneur and the investor diverged (Parhankangas & Hellström, 2007).
6. Market Risk - the unknown market environment that could result in competitive
challenges and whether or not market demand supported the growth of the startup venture
(Parhankangas & Hellström, 2007).
Chapter Overview
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research by setting context for the need of
frameworks to help guide entrepreneurs through myriad decisions that impact the successful or
failed outcomes of their ventures. It also clarified a gap between how entrepreneurs perceive risk
differently than investors and it proposed the need for this gap to be closed. The purpose of the
study was presented in the Statement of the Problem, which was to determine if there is a
common set of perceived critical risk factors among a group of experienced investors that could
cause them to reject a deal out of hand. The Significance of the Study suggests the utility for
entrepreneurs, investors, and those who educate and mentor them. The research questions were
presented followed by the delimitations and limitations.
Chapter 2 is a review of the literature with respect to how entrepreneurs perceive risk,
how investors evaluate risks in their decision making and delineating between the subjective and
objective aspects of evaluating deals.
Chapter 3 provides a description of the Delphi Technique as well as presents the research
questions, instrumentation, data collection and validity.
Chapter 4 presents the detailed analysis of the data.
Chapter 5 provides the findings and conclusions as well as recommendations for practice
and future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature proved to be rich in the study of risk from both the perspective of
entrepreneurs and that of investors. A key purpose of this Literature Review was to set a context
for these perspectives and highlight the key differences between them. Much of the literature
was based on understanding the observed decision processes of investors after the investment
decisions had been made. Categorization of risk proved to be a popular topic among researchers
and it is clear from this review of research that there are distinct differences in how entrepreneurs
percieve and approach risk, and how investstors consider risk in their investment decisions.
These differences are highlighted in five major sections of this chapter beginning with the
entrepreneur perspective and moving toward the investor perspective. This discussion leads to a
consolidation of existing research into the categorization of risk to set a backdrop for the
research of this dissertation and it ends with the relevance of risk as a topic of the entrepreneur’s
presentation of the business opportunity to the investment community.
This chapter is presented in five sections to follow the flow mentioned above. The first is
Risk and the Entrepreneur. It is a review of research into entrepreneurs and how they related to
risk, uncertainty, and failure. The second section is Investors and the Perception of Risk, where
the investment process is introduced and how risk entered into the decision making of investors.
The concept of investor-perceived risk is introduced and distinguished from how entrepreneurs
perceive risk. Organization of Risk reviews research into how subjective and even unconscious
evaluations of risk fit into categories, which was useful in designing the research methodology
for this study. Relationship Risk reviews what may be the most powerful and challenging aspect
of the study of risk in investment decision making; the power of the personal relationship. The
review of literature concludes with Once Upon a Time, a section of how all of this related to the
19

importance of conveying risk mitigation themes in the stories that entrepreneurs tell about their
companies.
Risk and the Entrepreneur
The Entrepreneur
To set a proper context for this study, a reference for the definition of entrepreneur was
appropriate. Benjamin (2006) provided an excellent, albeit detailed, grounding. He said
entrepreneurship is,
…a process of strategic thinking required to maintain an independent belief system that
supports discovery, exploration and exploitation of wealth opportunities that destabilize
prior market equilibria, demonstrating innovation, creativity and entrepreneurism to
generate new flexible, adaptive and responsible market spaces that reward people ready,
able and willing to meet emerging individual and societal needs, wants, hopes and
expectations (p.6).
Benjamin referred to Legge and Hindle (1997), who stated “Becoming an entrepreneur involves
a conscious decision to create more value than you can capture personally; that no matter how
well you do, the world at large will be even better off” (p.19). Barrenger and Ireland (2016)
defined entrepreneurship as “…the process by which individuals pursue opportunities without
regard to resources they currently control for the purpose of exploiting future goods and services
(p. 13).”
A theme emerged from these definitions: entrepreneurship is a process, a conscious
decision, a lifestyle, a skill, and it involves the desire to create value, usually without access to
all the necessary resources. Benjamin, in his effort to establish an integrated theory of
entrepreneurship summarized it well by adding that entrepreneurs generally responded positively
to both risk and opportunity (Benjamin, 2006). Van Ness and Seifert (2016) used the term risk
20

in their definition; “entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who have risked or intend to risk
their personal capital, personal time, and/or personal reputation in pursuit of business ventures”
(p. 90).
Defining Risk, Uncertainty, and Failure
Mullins and Forlani (2005) defined risk as involving the likelihood and magnitude of
outcomes falling below target. The motivation for taking risk was the chance for gain but they
defined risk more clearly as the likelihood of “realizing some magnitude of loss” (p.48). Hirai
(2010) added that risk is, “any situation where there is a possibility of an outcome that we would
rather avoid” (p. 1).
As researchers began to look into the concept of risk as it related to entrepreneurship, a
distinction between risk and uncertainty developed. Folta (2007) pointed out that risk can be
quantified and therefore, be controlled, although controlling for risk may have an impact on
innovation. But the big problem with risk, as Folta defined it, is that risk is a quantifiable
attribute based on predictions and probabilities from observed historical data and available
information. A common characteristic of entrepreneurship is that there is no history and
therefore, no data from which to derive probabilities. Schendel (2007) contended that the
entrepreneur is not confronted with risk at all, but rather uncertainty. Entrepreneurs must deal
with high levels of ambiguity because in most cases there is no information available to
adequately render probabilities and calculate risks, (Hmieleski & Baron, 2008).
Uncertainty is at the heart of defining entrepreneurship and the personality characteristics
of the entrepreneur. While the technical distinctions between risk (quantifiable) and uncertainty
(unquantifiable) are important, for the purpose of this dissertation, the word ‘risk’ was used to
cover both concepts.
A discussion of risk in the context of failure is appropriate here. After all, it is the fear of
21

failure and loss that either impedes or drives the entrepreneurial process. Entrepreneurs have
been known to cite the fear of failure as one of the things that inspired their drive and drove their
success (Morgan & Sisak, 2016). This idea was supported by Cacciotti, Hayton, Mitchell, and
Giazitzoglu (2016), who studied the role fear played in entrepreneurial decision making. Gulst
(2011) provided a working definition for failure as “the entrepreneur’s dissatisfaction with the
venture’s progression” (p. iii). But Gulst also pointed out that entrepreneurs defined a failed
business as one that failed to make a profit and essentially ran out of cash. Another important
aspect of failure was that it is such a great teacher. Gulst studied this as did He (2014), who
found that entrepreneurs, either by personality trait or by multiple cycles of failure, developed a
high tolerance for uncertainty. The willingness to risk failure provided entrepreneurs with
opportunities for learning and personal growth and there was anecdotal evidence that investors
preferred entrepreneurs who have had at least one catastrophic failure, as long as it was someone
else’s money at stake (He, 2014). Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, and Flores (2010) found that
entrepreneurs who have experienced failure were less likely to be over optimistic about new
opportunities, which may have a positive impact on the ability to get funding. Gulst (2011) cited
nine key causes of entrepreneurial failure that will become important later in the discussion of
specific risk categories. Those causes are management strategy, missing entrepreneurial
characteristics, over-optimism and over-confidence, inexperience, lack of key partners,
competence of key people, financial issues, unfocused market needs, and opportunity evaluation.
Attitudes About Risk and Risk Tolerance
Risk tolerance is a character trait commonly associated with entrepreneurs. Most formal
definitions for entrepreneur included the assumption of risk. He (2014) cited literature dating
back to 1987 that put “risk taking” or “risk acceptance” (p. 20) at the top of most every listing of
entrepreneur characteristics. Palich and Bagby (1995) tackled this issue head-on by stating how
22

difficult it was to capture the relationship between risk-taking and other personality
characteristics. They proposed an alternate theory based on research that showed that
entrepreneurs were not necessarily predisposed toward risk more than anyone else. By applying
cognitive theory, the difference came from the way entrepreneurs framed the opportunity for
achieving positive outcomes.
Baron (1998) advanced this concept by postulating cognitive conditions which can
influence biases and errors when it comes to rational thought. These conditions included
information overload, a high degree of uncertainty, intense emotions, time pressures and
decreased physical states. These biases tended to push entrepreneurs into taking on opportunities
that others would not. Baron also pointed out that it was not so much the innate personality of
entrepreneurs that brought on this condition as much as these conditions were an integral part of
the entrepreneurial experience.
He (2014) wanted to understand the character traits of entrepreneurs compared to
traditional company managers. With regard to taking on risk, He concluded that entrepreneurs
were risk tolerant but described their propensity for risk as “sensible” and “calculated” (p. 27).
As for pure entrepreneurs who were not considered to be in leadership roles, risk taking ranked
high. For traditional leaders, risk taking ranked very low.
Risk: An Entrepreneurial Characteristic
Another key part of He’s (2014) research was to summarize entrepreneurial
characteristics found in the literature as observed by a number of researchers. Table 1 shows this
summary. It should be noted that some form of risk taking (identified in bold type) appears in all
six of the lists.
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Table 1
A Summary of Entrepreneurial Characteristics
Perren (2002)
Morris et al. (2008)
Drive to achieve
Risk acceptance
Innovation
Internal locus of control
Personal drive
Calculated risk taking
Belief in control
Ambiguity tolerance
Ambiguity tolerance
Commitment/perseverance
Need for
Independence
independence
Self confidence
Opportunity-seeking
Tolerance for failure
Intuitive
Problem solving
Carlund et al. (1996)
Kao (1991)
Vision
Opportunity orientation
Commitment
Risk taking
Self
confidence
Integrity and reliability
Creativity/innovation
Perseverance
Takes responsibility
High energy level
Need for achievement Desire to achieve
Resource marshalling Resourcefulness
Intuition
Growth orientation
Value adding
Creativity
Problem solving
Good networks
Team-building
Realism
Capacity
to
inspire
Seeking feedback
Growth orientation
Locus of control
Calculated risk taking Diligent
Integrity and reliability Pro-activity
Note. Bold type added for emphasis of risk-taking characteristic. Adapted from “The Perceived Personal
Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Leaders” by L. He, 2014, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 20.
Begley and Boyd (1987)
Need for achievement
Locus of control
Risk taking
propensity
Tolerance of
ambiguity
Type A behavior

Vecchio (2003)
Risk taking
Need for achievement
Need for autonomy
Self-efficacy
Locus of control
Overconfidence/hubris

Entrepreneurs and the Management of Risk
The review of literature, thus far, has established that the concepts risk tolerance, the
ability to deal with ambiguity, and the overall world of uncertainty mark the reality of being an
entrepreneur. This is not to say that entrepreneurs go about navigating all this risk blindly.
Entrepreneurs do, in fact, have ways of managing and controlling risk (Kuechle, Boulu-Reshef,
& Carr, 2016). Kuechle et al. (2016) found that in order to reduce uncertainty, entrepreneurs
deployed two strategies, predictive and control based. Predictive strategies are deployed when
information is available (in agreement with the classic definition of risk), whereas control based
strategies are used when there is more uncertainty.
But the management of risk has a downside. Folta (2007) found that as entrepreneurs
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took measures to control risk, they may stifle the very innovation that made their venture a
compelling opportunity. Furthermore, they may take measures to control spending at a time
when it could have a negative impact on future profits. Burns, Barney, Angus, and Herrick
(2016) researched how risk versus uncertainty impacted the way entrepreneurs sold their venture
to potential stakeholders such as investors and key partners. They found that under conditions of
risk, entrepreneurs were better off to focus on the opportunity, while under conditions of
uncertainty, enrolling stakeholders was based on attributes of the entrepreneur.
Investors and the Perception of Risk
The Game of Investing
There are two types of investors in startup companies that were the focus of this study.
The first type is Angel Investors (Angels) who are wealthy individuals that invest in startup
companies for a variety of reasons. They typically invest early in new ventures and have been
successful entrepreneurs themselves (Wiltbank et al., 2009). Angels play more in the uncertainty
realm as they invest typically in unproven technologies in unverified markets (Murray&
Marriott, 1998). The Angel Capital Association (2016) noted there were over 300,000 Angels in
the US who invested a total of $24 billion. The average investment deal was $345,000 in over
71,000 deals (Angel Capital Association 2016).
The second type of investors is Venture Capitalists (VC) who manage a fund of other
people’s money, which they invest in startups. The Angel Capital Association compared Angel
activity to VC activity in 2016. That year, VC’s invested $59 billion in over 4,300 deals at an
average of $13.6 million per deal. There were over 700 active firms that year (Angel Capital
Association, 2016). Compared to Angels, the VC deals were much larger but far fewer. VC’s
tend to invest later in the growth stage of startup companies which is itself a risk mitigating
factor.
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Because of the inherent risk of investing in startups, the expected return among investors
is between five and ten times the amount invested. While statistics vary, the general notion was
that out of 10 investments, three provided a significant return, four performed moderately, and
the rest “evaporated” (Higgins, 2008).
Decision Analysis
Korver (2012) stated “Failure may be the best teacher, but failure in early stage investing
comes at a high cost” (para. 1). In order to limit this cost, he implemented a framework used in
pharmaceutical research and oil/gas exploration called Decision Analysis. Korver acknowledged
that the same cognitive biases that induced entrepreneurs to take risks could be detrimental in the
face of uncertainty. Simply put, investors saw risk quite differently than entrepreneurs did.
Through Decision Analysis, Korver’s objective was to “marry the art with the science of
decision-making through a disciplined process” (para. 11).
Payne (2011) proposed a more detailed method that mitigated risk through a process of
valuation. That is, assigning a monetary value to a startup based on comparing several
categories to a known standard. Not surprisingly, those categories included team, opportunity
(market), product, competition, partnerships and financial. The categories were inclusive of those
listed by Korver (2012) but the twist was that rather than probability, the categories were
factored as a functional component of monetary value in the company. Consequently, more
risky companies carried less potential value. Hirai (2010) introduced a quadrant framework for
entrepreneurs and investors alike to evaluate startup risk objectively. The quadrants included the
categories of ignorable risk, nuisance risk, insurable risk and company killers. It was the
company killers that involved the most attention and they included market, competition,
technology (product), financial, people (team), legal and systemic.
Korver (2012), Payne (2011), and Hirai (2010) all proposed evaluating risk according to
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a nearly identical set of criteria. There is a consistency that emerged in how investors evaluate
risk but when compared to the literature about how entrepreneurs view risk, the perspectives
were divergent.
Prediction, Control, and Trust
Wiltbank et al. (2009) studied investment outcomes of a number of Angels with regard to
two different decision-making strategies. Predictive strategies included extensive research of
data regarding markets and trends. Non-Predictive Control strategies included referring to
acquaintances and leveraging personal experience with regard to the potential investment deal.
The research found that those deploying control strategies tended to experience fewer failures
than those using predictive strategies. Those using predictive strategies tended to make larger
investments, but there was no correlation to outcomes, which suggested that within the various
frameworks investors used to evaluate and control risk, the best results were derived from the
least technical approaches. Investors were using categories, probabilities, and frameworks but
they were also, to some extent, measuring with their gut, it seems.
Enter: The Use of Heuristics
The literature reviewed thus far suggests that the evaluation of risk, both on the part of
entrepreneurs and investors, was a conscious and deliberate system of defined processes and
disciplines, with or without information, where probabilities were carefully considered and
outcomes were predicted. Many of the researchers suggested frameworks and best practices to
implement a more structured approach to evaluating risk in the early stages of an investment
deal. But implementation of structured frameworks early in the process can be problematic, if
for no other reason than sheer volume of deals. In 2016, Angels completed over 71,000 deals
(Angel Capital Association, 2016). Harrison, Dibben, and Mason (1997) found that over the
years up to 97% of entrepreneurial funding deals were rejected. Paul, Whittam and Wyper,
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(2007) noted that a typical investor looked at 10 or even 20 deals to do one. An investment deal
took anywhere from three to 18 months to close. The problem is not one of strategy or process.
It is purely one of time management and focused attention. There are models that suggest how
investors can weigh and score potential deals, but typically, they used cognitive short cuts, or
heuristics to reduce the total number of potential deals down to a manageable level (Maxwell,
Jeffrey, & Lévesque, 2011). They outlined two stages early in the decision process: selection
and post selection. At both stages, investors were looking for a fatal flaw that would kill the deal
early and quickly. The use of heuristics was common in decision making. Maxwell et al. (2011)
found the use of heuristics was generally accurate, although they warned that deviation from
actual frequency can occur as exemplified by the fact that most people believe they are more
likely to die in a plane crash than they are in an automobile accident (Barrabi, 2014; Maxwell et
al., 2011). They summarized the concept by noting that some accuracy may be sacrificed for
expediency. These researchers also acknowledged that investors tended to use heuristics, but
they often developed them subconsciously. Despite that, Maxwell et al. (2011) found eight
distinct categories or decision criteria relative to this use of heuristics:
1.

Market Potential – measured in terms of market size

2.

Product Adoption – the extent to which markets had been penetrated. Commonly
known as market share

3.

Protectability – intellectual property such as patents and trademarks

4.

Entrepreneur Experience – reputation and record of past entrepreneurial experiences

5.

Product Status – referring to the stage of product development

6.

Route to Market – sometimes known as a go-to-market strategy, or how the product
will be found by the customer

7.

Customer Engagement – validation that customers will in fact, buy the product
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8.

Financial Projections – timeline to cash flow of the business and future profitability

In subsequent research the same team determined that Angels tended to aggregate their
perceptions of these eight categories into levels of risk and return (Jeffrey, Lévesque, &
Maxwell, 2016). If the perceived risk was too high or the anticipated rate of return was too low
for any of the eight categories, it was considered a fatal flaw and the deal was rejected early
without any further cognitive effort. The risk and return formed thresholds that allowed even
quicker rejection of opportunities that held little promise.
The Stages of Investment – The Concept of Timing
Maxwell, Jeffrey, and Lévesque (2011) suggested two distinct stages where the use of
heuristics was more likely to influence decisions: the selection and post-selection stages. A
closer look into these stages formed a better understanding of the timing. Three stages were
identified by Amatucci and Sohl (2004), which were the pre-investment stage, contract
negotiation, and the post-investment stage. The screening process normally took place in the
pre-investment stage and led to due diligence. The investment stage involved the term sheet and
negotiations while the post-investment stage involved future funding and eventual exits.
Building on this work, Paul et al. (2007) identified five stages summarized in Figure 1.
Paul et al. (2007) indicated that relationships were forming at the Familiarization Stage,
which was where the much of the subjective decision-making took place. The process slowly
became more formal as the deal progressed into the Screening Stage. By the time the deal
progressed to the Bargaining Stage, the process was largely driven by contracts and negotiations.
However, Paul et al. (2007) warned that the process was in no way orderly.
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Familiarization Stage

Learning about
opportunity

Meeting the
Entrepreneur

Screening Stage

Initial
screen

Detailed
screen

Bargaining Stage

Deal
structure

Agreement

Harvesting Stage

Managing Stage

Figure 1. A model of the angel investment process. Adapted from “Towards a model of the
business angel investment process,” by S. Paul, G. Whittam, and J. Wyper, 2007, Venutre
Capital (9) 2, p. 114.
Relationship queues could become a factor at any point in the process. They also drew a
distinction between Angels and VC’s noting that Angels were more reliant on relationship to
hedge risk in those early stages. Cox, Lortie and Gramm (2017) echoed the point by adding that
Angels tended to make decisions based on an “array” of non-financial factors more so than VC’s.
Carpentier and Suret (2015) found a similar model at play when analyzing the decision-making
process of Angel Investment Groups, which are formally organized groups of Angels who work
together to review and syndicate deals. Angel Investment Groups tended to have a primary
organizer or manager who served as gatekeeper and performed administrative and due diligence
activities. The following is a summary of that process (Carpentier & Suret, 2015):


Step 1 – Prescreen – the gatekeeper assesses each opportunity and typically rejected
up to 68% of proposals based on criteria such as location, industry, development
stage and size of the investment. These hardly even qualify as subjective but
heuristics are definitely in play.
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Step 2 – Initial screening – the gatekeeper, along with a small group of Angels review
the opportunity for fit within the group and to determine if the entrepreneur will be
invited to pitch to the group. Thirteen percent of the proposals are retained at this
point. Survival at this stage involved the subjective opinions of this small group.



Step 3 – Presentation to the group – short (10 minute) presentations were made at
monthly meetings. Only 11% survived this round and it involved recruiting 3 or 4
Angels to lead the project.



Step 4 – The hour-long presentation – where only 3 were rejected leaving 10%
survivors.



Step 5 – Detailed analysis – This is where the formal objective decision making
began. It includes document and financial reviews and a series of meetings. Prior to
step 5, the majority of decisions moving entrepreneurs forward relied mostly on
opinions and subjectivity. This step jettisoned more until only 4% were left and these
were offered term sheets and started negotiations.

This process presented above highlighted a fairly arduous journey for the entrepreneur
and it also reinforced how few deals were offered to the population of those seeking funding. In
this study, 637 entrepreneurs started but only 26 (4%) recieved deal offers. Only until Stage 5
did objective decision-making criteria come into play. The mean amount of time to close these
deals from start to finish was 4.5 months (Carpentier & Suret, 2015).
The Organization of Risk
The Early Development of Categories
Entrepreneurs and investors have somewhat differing perspectives of risk. Furthermore,
it has been noted that investors tended to use subjective shortcuts or heuristics to wade through
the sheer volume of potential early stage opportunities to get to those that possess the most fit,
31

interest and potential for a return. This section focuses on the research into how the concept of
risk was segmented and organized into categories.
Parhankangas and Hellström (2007) identified two broad category headers; Agency and
Market risks. Agency risk referred to the characteristics of the entrepreneur, principally where
the interests of the entrepreneur and the investor diverged. Market risk referred to the unknown
market environment that could result in competitive challenges and whether or not market
demand supported the growth of the startup venture. Within these two broad categories, they
identified a number of characteristics that were rated as perceptions on the part of investors in
rejecting deals. These can be seen in Table 2 (Parhankangas & Hellström (2007):
Table 2
Risk Perceptions from Angels Who Reject Deals
Agency Risks
Market Risks
Dishonest Entrepreneurs
Unattractive industry
Different cash flow objectives
Weak customer demand
Contractual ambiguities
Too few buyers
Different profitability objectives
Readily substitutable competitive
Different growth objectives
products
Short-term interest on the part of the
Technical obsolescence
entrepreneur
Entrepreneurs not performing their
responsibilities
Manipulation of financial information
Note: Adapted from “How experience and perceptions shape risky behaviour: Evidence from the
venture capital industry,” by A. Parhankangas and T. Hellström, 2007, Venture Capital (9) 3, p.
195.
The balance of Parhankangas and Hellström’s research (2007) centered on risk reduction
strategies observed from the investors. They found four strategies: syndication, whereby
investors spread risk among a portfolio of companies; monitoring of the entrepreneur’s activities
through regular contact and reporting; information seeking in the form of detailed research; and
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the use of preferred stock which give preferential rights to the investors at the time of liquidation
(exit sale or initial public offering of stock.).
Miloud, Aspelund, and Cabrol (2012) studied the investment process of VC’s from
origination of the deal to the exit of the investment. The process was well defined and it was
centered on determining a value of the company, which determined how much equity ownership
was required of the company founders in return for the investment. While the investment
process was fairly detailed, valuation at the early stages was quite difficult because the valuation
algorithms were based on the present value of future cash flows, which were trended from
current cash flows. Since there are no cash flows with a startup, valuation was determined by
resorting to best guesses (Miloud et al., 2012). Rather than straight out “pure guesses”, Miloud
et al. (2012) saw how investors focused on inputs such as those listed below:
Industry organization – this was a focus on how the startup’s product was differentiated
from the other competitors in the market. Also important was an evaluation of how the
market is projected to grow in the future.
Entrepreneurial resources – evaluated by the experience of the entrepreneur. Categories
of experience included technical experience with the product development, industry
experience, experience as a key employee and experience with other startup companies.
Top management team – experience and completeness of the founding team and key
management team with regard to market, industry, startups, finance, etc.
External ties and startup valuation – relationships with existing and potential partners.
Also evaluated were other relationships with investors, industry stakeholders and industry
connections.
Later Developments in Risk Categorization
Streletzki, and Schulte (2013) attempted to link VC selection criteria with new venture
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growth and returns at exit. They identified five major groupings of selection criteria as follows:
Founder team – experience in industry and with other startups. Also evaluated was the
network of the founding team
Company – criteria included four main topics: development stage of the product, location
of the startup with a preference on being geographically close, whether the company is a
spin-off of a university or corporation, and existing partnerships.
Product – criteria included patent protection, proof-of-concept (functional prototype), and
diversity relative to the number of products available to sell.
Market – included market segments (with a preference on business-to-consumer) and
strategy regarding existing markets versus new markets.
Financial Criteria – projections and valuation
Cox et al. (2017) took the work of Maxwell et al. (2011) and reorganized it into four
main criteria categories: internal, external, fit, and technology. Internal criteria were related to
the management team while external criteria related to market characteristics. Technology
criteria were rather obvious, but the risk criteria added to the conversation was that of fit;
specifically, two elements: industry fit and entrepreneur fit. Industry fit had to do with the
investor’s familiarity and expertise in the industry of the venture, and entrepreneur fit had to do
with whether or not the investor believed the entrepreneur had to proper experience to operate in
the industry. This point came up again in the discussion of relationship risk.
Quality of the Leadership Team
Much of the cited research regarding risk criteria was observed post-deal and identified
after the fact. In some cases attempts were made to quantify these risks to see which were given
more emphasis in the decision making process. It stood to reason that researchers turned their
attention specifically to this quantification problem in order to find what the most important risk
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criteria were. The answer is that it depends, but anectdotally, the number one concern among
risk criteria for investors has been the management team. One anecdote that persists to this day
goes like this: “investors would rather invest in an ‘A’ team with a ‘B’ technology, than an ‘A’
technology with a ‘B’ team.” Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, and Henkel (2008) determined that
criteria related to the management team rated consistently in the top three categories. They were
also able to trace a possible origin of the above anecdote to Bygrave (1997). Matusik, George
and Heely (2008) echoed this sentiment that the quality of the leadership team was a key
characteristic. Franke et al. (2008) developed a hierarchy of management team characteristics.
They were in order of rating; industry experience, field of education, university degree,
leadership experience, mutual acquaintance, age of team members, and prior experience. In a
more recent study, Drover, Wood, and Zacharakis (2017) distilled these criteria down to the
common “big four”: 1. Management team, 2. Market, 3. Offering (technology or product), and 4.
Financial potential.
Toft-Kehler, Wennberg, and Kim (2014) found a “non-linear” relationship between the
experience of the team and ultimate financial performance of the venture. Their argument was
that experienced entrepreneurs actually did worse because their experience created “barriers to
learning,” especially those who had one success before starting the next venture. They posited
that entrepreneurship can be learned-by-doing but it takes several experiences to build the
instincts necessary for success. Apparently, practice (and some good old failure) does make
perfect (or at least better performing startups). Toft-Mehler et al. also concluded that with the
use of heuristics and experience, perceptions did not always equal reality.
Relationship Risk
At the outset of this review of literature, it was established that investors tended to use
heuristics and subjective influences in their decision-making process in the early stages of an
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investment deal. From the work of these researchers, there may be categories that could provide
a framework for entrepreneurs to think about how they should approach investors. Some
categories, like market size and sales projections, could be addressed objectively (with numbers)
so as to reduce perceived uncertainty. However, the review of literature revealed a risk category
that is firmly planted in the realm of subjectivity and uncertainty and it could possibly trump all
risk criteria within a moment. That criterion is Relationship Risk.
Failure in the First Meeting: Building or Damaging Trust
Maxwell et al. (2011) postulated that an entrepreneur’s behavior during an initial meeting
with an investor could either build or damage trust, which determined the likelihood of receiving
an investment offer. A new risk category was introduced, “relationship risk,” which was defined
as the risk that an entrepreneur may not make the same decisions when spending the investor’s
money as the investor would. Relationship risk introduced the concept of ‘moral hazard’. The
conclusions were that during initial meetings between investors and entrepreneurs, investors
tended to “intuitively audit” positive and negative behaviors related to trust as a way of
determining relationship risk prior to offering an investment. Put succinctly, they had to like
you.
The impact of trust did not end with the first meeting. Bammens and Collewaert (2014)
built on the work of Maxwell and Levesque and others to determine how trust impacted the
investor’s perception of company performance. Trust, it seemed, could be a two-edged sword in
a relationship. Trust led to better communication, which led to improved performance as seen by
the investor. But the downside was that an emphasis on maintaining trust could lock the players
into patterns of expected behavior, which may not be sustainable in a dynamic business
environment. In 2014, Maxwell and Lévesque looked into this aspect of trustworthiness. They
found that in the initital meeting with an investor, entrepreneurs who conveyed a set of trust36

building behaviors were extend more offers than those who displayed turst-damaging behaviors.
Furthermore, trust damaging and trust violating behaviors, even though they were unintentional,
were present when the entrepreneur failed to receive an offer, regardless of how well the
entreprenuer lined up with the rest of the critical factors discussed (Maxwell & Lévesque, 2014).
This all refers back to how investors attempt to control for risk. Maxwell and Lévesque (2014)
pointed out that relationship was one of those control strategies and perhaps one of the most
powerful. Should the entrepreneur display a behavior that damaged or violated trust, they were in
for further control mechanisms if not a flat out rejection. The research team was able to identify
specific trust damaging and violating behaviors while directly observing entrepreneurs engaged
with investors in the deal making process. These behaviors are provided and ranked in order of
occurance in Table 3.
Table 3
Summary of Relationship Risk Factors
Ranked list of Relationship Risk Factors
1. Competence

5. Consistency

9. Benevolence

2. Accuracy

6. Judgement

10. Disclosure

3. Explanation

7. Alignment

11. Reliance

4. Openness

8. Receptiveness

Note: Adapted from “Trustworthiness: A critical ingredient for entrepreneurs seeking investors,”
by A. Maxwell and M. Lévesque, 2014, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice (38) 5, p. 1069.
Drover, Wood, and Payne (2014) built upon the concept. They were studying elements
of agency risk and how investors sought to control for it. They pointed out that entrepreneurs
preferred to maintain autonomy in decision making and had to be prepared to relinquish some of
it when they took other people’s money. This set up the potential for conflict, which as Maxwell
and Lévesque (2014) pointed out, could be attenuated through building trust. Drover et al. (2014)
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introduced three primary drivers in relationship building: entrepreneurial prestige, opportunity
attractiveness, and control. They underscored the fact that these drivers were primarily
subjective perceptions and they concluded that entrepreneurs were most likely to receive an offer
when these subjective ratings are high.
The Double-Sided Moral Hazard
Fairchild (2011) extended the trust relationship in the other direction by concluding that
trust played a role in the entrepreneur’s decision to choose a funding partner. VC’s generally
provided higher level resources and value than Angels. They had access to better networks and
more administrative support. But some entrepreneurs opted for the empathy and trust that may
be more obvious with Angels. Fairchild suggested that entrepreneurs be aware of this their
decision-making to better balance between relational aspect and higher value creating potential.
Telling the Company Story
It was clear from the research literature that entrepreneurs viewed risk differently from
investors. Furthermore, investors used a combination of methods, both objective and subjective,
to quantify risk in their decision-making process, even down to the level of evaluating
relationship risk. Maxwell and Levesque (2011) determined that even the first impression in the
initial meeting could make the difference. This brought the discussion to communication. If an
entrepreneur had one shot to convey a message of managed risk to an investor who evaluated the
business and the behavior, then the story had better be good.
There are a number of resources to assist entrepreneurs in making better presentations,
from slide design to presentation techniques, but there is nothing in the mainstream literature that
treats the entrepreneur’s story as a narrative. Gartner (2007) claimed that narrative approaches
could provide a powerful set of tools to understand what entrepreneurs say about themselves and
their ventures. This work focused more on how to study entrepreneurs themselves rather than
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how entrepreneurs use narrative for their own purposes but the essential findings could apply.
Gartner pointed out that “story construction is a process of creating reality” (p. 615), which was
at the heart of what an entrepreneur hoped to accomplish in attracting venture capital. He put it
all in context: “The narrative of entrepreneurship is the generation of hypotheses about how the
world might be: how the future might look and act” (p. 614).
Conclusion
The research literature suggests that entrepreneurs and investors place importance on the
mitigation and management of risk and uncertainty. But the literature is also clear that
entrepreneurs and investors evaluate risk from divergent perspectives. Investors are exposed to
hundreds of potential deals over a year’s time and in order to wade through the sheer volume and
reduce the noise, they tend to use heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to identify which deals to
disregard quickly and which to pursue. Research in this area has focused largely on outcomes, or
the back end of the investment process showing that there are categories of risk factors that may
result in a deal failing to go forward. Other research introduced the concept of relationship risk,
which is even more subjective than arbitrary judgements about financial and market
performance.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHOD
Introduction
The research methodology chosen for this dissertation was the Delphi Method, Delphi
Technique, or simply Delphi. The method was developed in the 1950’s by Norman Dalkey, who
worked for the Rand Corporation (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The application was a
military project in which Dalkey was developing a way to estimate or predict the number of
atomic weapons needed to achieve a certain outcome (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). It was designed
as a group communication tool used to achieve convergence of opinion among a group of experts
(Hsu & Sandford, 2007). The technique itself has been researched for its fitness as a research
tool over the years and, despite some challenges, it has emerged as a fit and useful technique.
Delbecq, Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975) determined that Delphi was particularly useful in
the following applications:
1. To determine or develop a range of possible program alternatives,
2. To explore or expose underlying assumptions or information leading to different
judgments,
3. To seek out information which may generate a consensus on the part of the
respondent group,
4. To correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of disciplines, and
5. To educate the respondent group as to the diverse and interrelated aspects of the topic
(p. 11).
The Delphi Method was chosen as a research methodology for this dissertation. The
applications highlighted above fit well with the purpose and scope for this research.
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Purpose Statement
The purpose of this Delphi study was to determine if there is a common set of perceived
critical risk factors among a group of experienced investors that could cause them to reject a deal
out of hand. The Delphi method was appropriate for this study because the information was
uncertain, difficult to quantify, and subject to opinion (Hsu & Standford, 2007; Murray, 1979).
Choosing Delphi satisfied at least three of the five applications presented by Delbecq et al.
(1975). Knowledge, opinions, and speculation all provided value to the research and Delphi is
particularly well suited as a research methodology (Dalkey, 1969).
Research Questions
1. To what extent are critical risk factors are involved in the decision-making process of
investors in considering a deal?
2. Which critical risk factors (execution, market, technological, financial, regulatory, etc.)
do investors consider to be common among most investment decisions?
3. Of these most common categories, what is the relative weight of importance among
them?
4. What differences occur among the critical risk factors between Angel investors and
Venture Capitalists?
The Delphi Method
Delphi can be used to quantify subjective judgements from a group of experts on a
collective basis in a way that cannot be done through the use of precise analytical techniques
(Alder & Ziglio, 1996). Four key features that define the essence of Delphi were offered by
Rowe and Wright (1999):
1. Anonymity of participants – allowed the participants to exercise opinions free of any
social pressures of conformity,
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2. Iteration – the participants were allowed to refine their perspectives in view of the
group’s overall consensus as the different rounds continue,
3. Controlled Feedback – Each participant was given feedback on how their responses
measure against the median responses of the group, giving them the opportunity to
modify their stances on the topics, and
4. Statistical aggregation of the responses – allowed for quantitative analysis and data
interpretation.
Linstone and Turoff (1975) presented evidence of the flexibility of the method and its
ability to adapt to the specific needs of the study at hand. Skulmoski et al. (2007) presented a
number of formal studies that used Delphi research techniques to identify, validate, and forecast
a range of research interests, most notably in Information Systems where critical projects needed
to be ranked in order of importance and risk. Dalkey (1969) clarified the use of Delphi in
decision making involving assertions that come from knowledge of a group of individuals,
opinions, which have some basis in belief but fell short of knowledge, and finally speculation,
which had little or no backing from evidence. Dalkey concluded that although the lines between
these three forms of input are rather blurry, opinion and speculation did have value. Murray
(1979) recommend, in a detailed critique of Delphi, that the technique was well suited in
researching areas of high uncertainty, where more traditional analytical methods did not apply,
such as the area involving opinion.
The Structure of the Delphi Method
A typical Delphi study could be thought of as consisting of three phases: brainstorming,
consolidation, and ranking (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). During the brainstorming phase,
relevant factors are gathered. In the consolidation phase, the long list of factors is analyzed for
duplication and relevance, and the list is pared down. In the ranking phase, the items in the list
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are rated on a number of criteria that could include importance, relevance, risk, or likelihood.
The process essentially involves a series of questionnaires beginning with an open-ended broad
question (the Delphi Question) and continues through subsequent rounds of surveys until a
consensus is reached among the panel of experts (Delbecq et al., 1975). The earliest Delphi
studies used five rounds of surveys (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963), and some Delphi studies can be
accomplished with as few as two rounds (Thangaratinam & Redman, 2005). However, there
seems to be some consensus that three rounds are usually sufficient (Brooks, 1979; Cyphert &
Gant, 1971; Ludwig, 1997).
Hsu and Sandford (2007) provided a suitable description of the various rounds of
surveys. Round 1 was typically a questionnaire with one or more open ended questions. In the
analysis phase of Round 1, responses were gathered, consolidated, complied in aggregate, and
summarized. From this exercise, the questionnaire for Round 2 was developed. In Round 2,
participants were provided the information from Round 1 and asked to rank or otherwise rate the
items. Respondents were given the opportunity to provide written rationale for their choices. In
Round 3, participants were given the median rankings from Round 2, along with their own
personal responses. They were given the opportunity to revise their ratings or keep their position
outside the consensus. Based on the work of Hsu and Sandford (2007) the design methodology
for this dissertation consisted of a three-round survey process in which critical risk factors are
identified by participants using open ended questions in Round 1, weighting each critical risk
factor on a 5-point Likert scale for Importance and a 3-point Likert Scale for Frequency in
Round 2, and allowing for a revised weighting based on group comparisons in Round 3.

43

Sampling
Sample Size
The actual number of participants in a Delphi study is a subject still in need of consensus
among the research literature (Hsu & Standford, 2007). Delbecq et al. (1975) recommend using
a minimal number while Ludwig (1997) found that most Delphi studies used between 15 and 20
participants. Dalkey and Helmer (1963) used as few as seven and in early studies on the method.
Dalkey, Rourke, Lewis, and Snyder (1972) reported a dramatic decrease in error as group size
increased past 15, and also a steady increase in reliability as group size increased past 11. In
early experiments, they reported a correlation coefficient approaching 0.9 with a group of 13
respondents (Dalkey et al., 1972). Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) targeted between 10 and 18
participants for their studies. Baker, Lovell, and Harris (2006) offered that Delphi samples
should be less than 20. Based on these ranges the sample size chosen for this project was 20
participants, allowing for potential attrition of up to 5 participants. Twenty participants were
recruited to begin the study and 18 ended up completing the process.
Choice of Participants
Fundamental to the reliability of a Delphi study is the choice of experts (Baker et al.,
2006). Baker et al. (2006) suggested three themes in defining an expert: knowledge based on
professional qualifications, experience based on length of time, and ability to influence policy
(make independent decisions). Characteristics and qualifications of desirable panelists should be
identified and used to recruit and select the panel participants (Ludwig, 1997). The fundamental
criteria used to define experts for this study included the following:


Primary decision-making authority



Minimum of 10 investments over 5 years



At least one positive net return
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These criteria were tested and validated by a pilot group of Angel Investors, Venture
Capitalists, and entrepreneurship faculty at the University of Tennessee.
Recruitment and Onboarding
A list of 25 potential participants was created through personal networks of the researcher
and faculty in the University of Tennessee, the Director of the Knoxville Entrepreneurship
Center, and Directors of the Angel Capital Group of Knoxville, TN and the Angel Roundtable of
Johnson City, TN. The sample was recruited within a geographical radius of 350 miles centered
about Knoxville, Tennessee including Northeast Tennessee, Knoxville, Chattanooga, Nashville,
Atlanta, London (KY) and Cincinnati. This region contains the typical population of investors
available to most startups in the region. Diversity was a factor in selecting the sample in terms of
Venture Capitalists, Angels, and Angel Groups.
Each candidate was contacted individually, either in person or through a phone call where
the purpose, scope, and mechanics of the study were explained. The researcher also explained to
each candidate that their participation was to be voluntary, their identity and participation in the
project were confidential, and their identities would be known only to the researcher.
Once each participant verbally agreed, a follow-up email was sent formally inviting them
to participate in the study with a request to reply with their confirmation of willingness to be a
part of the expert panel. Upon beginning the survey in Round 1, the conclusion of the Statement
of Informed Consent required a positive response to the following set of conditions:
“Clicking the “agree button” below indicates





I have read the above information
I agree to volunteer
I am at least 18 years old
NOTE: Agreeing to this Informed Consent applies to this and the two subsequent
surveys in the study”
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Instrumentation
There are four essential features of Delphi: anonymity of participants, iteration,
controlled feedback, and statistical aggregation of results (Rowe & Wright 1999). An online
survey software application provided utility for the first three. Each participant was invited to
sign in online for each of three rounds of surveys (iteration). Only the researcher knew the
identities of the respondents (anonymity) and the construction of the surveys provided the
controlled feedback. All the resulting raw data were stored in the Cloud within the online survey
application. Statistical aggregation of the results was performed using Microsoft Excel, which
proved sufficient for the task.
The overview provided by Skulmoski et al. (2007) provided a graphic representation of
the process used to design the surveys as shown in Figure 2.
Experience
Literature
Review

Research
Question

Research
Design

Delphi R1
Design

Delphi R1
Pilot

Delphi R1 Survey
& Analysis

Pilot
Studies
Delphi R2
Design

Delphi R2 Survey
& Analysis

Delphi R3
Design

Delphi R3 Survey
& Analysis

Research Documentation,
Verification, and Generalization

Figure 2. Typical Delphi Process. Adapted from “The Delphi Method for Graduate Research”
by developed by G. Skulmoski, F. Hartman, & J. Krahn, 2007, Journal of Information
Technology Education, 6, p. 3.
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Survey 1
Survey 1 included some basic demographic information relative to the participant’s
investment profile, location, and experience. Basic instructions were given regarding how to
complete the survey questions. The survey opened up with the following request (Delphi
Question):
“Please list all the critical risk factors you look for when evaluating a potential
investment deal. To the extent you can, or are willing, please include a measurable
quantifier.”
A pilot study was performed upon the completion of the design of Survey 1 in order to
test the survey application for utility and clarity. The pilot group consisted of entrepreneurship
faculty at the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee. A full copy of Survey
1 can be found in Appendix A.
Survey 2
Survey 2 was derived from the results of Survey 1. The following instructions were
given to the participants:
“For your convenience, the critical risk factors have been arranged in categories. As you
prepare for this survey, please keep these things in mind:






Consider and rate the factors you commonly use early in the investment process,
during the time prior to due diligence, when you are forming
relationships. These should be things that come up during presentations,
conversations and early meetings.
Go with your immediate first reaction. Do not try to over-analyze a factor. Your
first impression is usually indicative of your judgement.
This list far exceeds the total number of any individual's responses. If you see a
response you did not mention in Survey #1 but would like to rate it, please do so.
But, do not feel you have to rate every response as important.”

During the analysis of results from Survey 1, concern developed due to the sheer number
of critical risk factors. The concern was whether the participants would be able to differentiate
the importance of each critical risk factor enough for a suitable ranking to be possible. An
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alternative strategy was developed to provide more diversity among the responses in case this
concern materialized. The alternative strategy was to include a 3-point Likert rating of
“Frequency of Use” in addition the 5-point Likert rating of “Importance”. The following are the
instructions given to the participants:
“Each of the following pages contains a list of critical factors organized by overall
category. For each critical factor, there are two rating scales; one for importance and the
other for frequency of use.
The following definitions correspond to each point of the importance scale:






Not Important - This factor is not considered early in the process
Minimally Important - This factor is worth mentioning
Moderately Important - This factor is considered based on circumstances
Important - This factor is usually considered for most cases
Critically Important - This factor is a sudden death deal breaker

The Frequency of Use scale is pretty self-explanatory:




Never - I never consider this factor
Occasionally - I use this factor from time to time
Always - I never make a decision without considering this factor

Other instructions:
1. Only rate those factors common to your thought process, rate the rest "Not
Important". Any skipped questions will be considered "Not Important".
2. You may move back and forth between pages.
3. At the end of the critical risk factors, there is a page for you to list any others you feel
were left out or came to mind during the survey.
4. The very last page of the survey asks you if you are ready to complete the survey. If
so, then the results will be record. Up until that time, you may leave and come back
later.”
A complete copy of Survey 2 can be found in Appendix A, which shows the layout of
each critical risk factor, along with the Importance rating and the Frequency of Use rating.
Survey 3
The results from Round 2 were compiled and a statistical analysis was performed,
consisting of calculating the mean, median and standard deviation for each critical factor. The
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results from the Importance ratings were compared to the results of the combined ratings of
Importance and Frequency of Use. Two conclusions were drawn. First, there proved to be
significant diversity among the data of the Importance ratings. Second, the addition of the
Frequency of Use data provided no significant difference over the results of the Importance
ratings alone. The decision was made to proceed to Survey 3 using only the Importance data.
The Qualtrics survey application provided a utility that cross referenced each
participant’s responses from Survey 2 into the questions for Survey 3. For each critical risk
factor from Survey 2, the participants were able to see the median score for the critical risk
factor, the range of ratings from the group, and their personal rating, followed by a field in which
they could alter their original ranking if they chose to do so. A copy of Survey 3 is included in
Appendix A showing the layout of each critical risk factor. The following are the instructions
for Survey 3:
“Each of the following pages contains a list of critical risk factors organized by overall
category. For each critical risk factor, you will see the median score, the range of scores of
the group, and your score highlighted in Bold Text.
The space in the column on the right is where you may change or alter your score for that
critical risk factor. If you do not wish to change your score, simply leave the space blank.
Other instructions:
1. If Your Score: 0, it means you did not enter a response for that question in Survey
#2. You may still rate the factor based on your reaction to the group; or you may
leave it blank as well.
2. You may move back and forth between pages.
3. The very last page of the survey asks you if you are ready to complete the survey. If
so, then the results will be recorded. Up until that time, you may leave and come
back later.”
Reliability and Validity
Hill and Fowles (1975) pointed out that one of the strengths of Delphi was also a
weakness with regard to reliability. That is the fact that Delphi is a flexible approach which
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excludes the method from standardized procedures. Bearing in mind that this particular critique
was contextual to the use of using Delphi as a forecasting tool, much of the reliability claims
dealt with the accuracy of said predictions. Nonetheless, Hill and Fowles (1975) provided
discussion on how to improve the reliability of Delphi methods; principally in two main areas.
First, design of the questionnaire. If wording was ambiguous, it could be interpreted differently
by different participants. The second area was in the choice of the participants. Delphi assumes
the participant panel was carefully chosen based on relevant criteria over the researcher’s
familiarity with the individuals. However, when the topic turned to validity, Hill and Fowles
(1975) were even less enthusiastic as they questioned the “best guess” approach of the method.
Woundenberg (1991) presented a more positive opinion of the accuracy of Delphi by
citing a number of experiments that proved forecasting accuracy improved through the iterative
process of multiple rounds and the anonymity of responses. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) pushed
back even harder when they stated that reliability between tests is not relevant because the
participants are expected to revise their answers. In addressing validity of the process, they
pointed out that Delphi has improved like any other survey method through careful design of the
questions, but they added that the process was self-correcting in that the participants validated
the researcher’s interpretations of the variables.
Baker et al. (2006) summarized the issue of reliability by stating that the use of experts
was fundamental to improving reliability and presented a framework for choosing an expert
panel. Landeta (2006) summared the validity of Delphi by suggesting that since the rise in
popularity in the 1980s, the novelty of Delphi had worn off and became accepted by the
scientific community as a valid research technique.
Based on the research discussed above, the following steps were taken to maximize the
reliability and validity of this Delphi based dissertation:
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Careful selection of the expert panel – Criteria were developed by consulting with a
pilot group of Venture Capitalists, Angel Investors and Entrepreneurship Faculty
from the University of Tennessee to ensure the panelists had sufficient experience and
expertise on the research topic.



Careful consideration of the questionnaires though simplification, review, and
piloting with the same pilot group mentioned above.



Anonymity – All the surveys were conducted with anonymity among the participants.
This protected against any undue influence of personality and allowed the participants
to evaluate their responses independently of peer group pressure to conform.



Iteration – Through three rounds, consensus was achieved over a core set of critical
factors.



Statistical aggregation – responses, albeit subjective, were quantified and analyzed
statistically.



Use of online survey tools to maximize the experience and to ensure privacy.
Data Collection

This study was performed using a series of three surveys, all conveyed and recorded in an
online based survey application called Qualtrics. Online links to the surveys were each
distributed via email to the participants described in the Sampling section above.
In Survey 1, an open-ended question was asked and the responses were collected in the
survey tool in a series of critical risk factors relevant to the process of making investment
decisions. In the analysis phase of Survey 1 the responses were reviewed, duplicates were
removed and a total aggregate list of all critical risk factors was configured in categories grouped
for similarity and convenience for the participants in Survey 2.
In Survey 2, the list of critical risk factors was distributed to the same participants, who
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were asked to rate each factor on a 5-point Likert scale for Importance and a 3-point Frequency
of Use scale. All results were recorded in the online survey application. In the analysis phase of
Round 2, each of the Likert ratings were converted to numerical values and analyzed by
calculating the mean, median and standard deviation for each critical factor for both Importance
and Frequency of Use. Then the Importance ratings were multiplied by the Frequency ratings for
each response and the mean, median and standard deviations were calculated for the combined
ratings Microsoft Excel was used for the analysis.
In Survey 3, each participant was given a survey with each critical factor listed, along
with the median score, range of maximum and minimum scores of the group, and the
participant’s own score for each factor. Every participant was given the opportunity to revise
their scores in light of the group responses. Results were collected and stored in the online
survey application.
All personal identity information pertaining to the participants was known only to the
researcher. All qualitative comments shared with the participants was cleansed of any
identifiable characteristics. There was no direct association from any of the data directly back to
the participant in any part of the study.
Data Analysis
Data collection for each of the three rounds of surveys necessitated three different
approaches to analysis.
Survey 1
Survey 1 was generally qualitative in approach in that participants were asked to list all
critical risk factors that come to mind in their decision-making process, along with a descriptor
clarifying each factor. During the analysis phase, the researcher combined the factors from all
the lists, grouping them into categories. Obvious duplicates were removed.
52

Survey 2
In Survey 2, the participants were asked to rate each critical risk factor on a 5-point
Likert scale for Importance and a 3-point Likert scale for Frequency of Use. The ratings were
converted to numerical values as the results were exported from the online survey application
and imported into Microsoft Excel. Mean, median, and standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum were calculated for each critical risk factor. Hill and Fowles (1975) recommended the
use of median as the preferred measure of central tendency for Delphi studies. For this reason,
the median score was used in Survey 3 to convey the central tendency of the group for each
critical risk factor. The mean values were used in the analysis of the overall rankings for each
critical risk factor.
These results were used to construct Survey 3 and presented along with each individual’s
personal score for each critical factor so each participant could review the median score against
their own rating.
Survey 3
The list of critical risk factors constructed from the analysis of Survey 2 was distributed
to the panelists with instructions to review their scores in light of the median and range for the
group. The participants were given the opportunity to revise their scores based on the knowledge
of how their answers compared with their peers. Analysis for Survey 3 was identical to Survey 2
except that in addition to median and standard deviation, inter-quartile ranges were calculated for
each factor (Green, 1982).
Final Analysis
The first phase of final analysis was to determine which critical risk factors achieved
consensus among the panel. Ulschak (1983) recommended a criterion whereby 80 percent of
ratings fall with two categories of a seven-point Likert scale as a measure of consensus. Green
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(1982) suggested that 70 percent should rate at least three or higher on a four point Likert scale
with the median being 3.25 or higher. For this study, any response where the rating was outside
the range of one Likert point above or below the median was discarded. The percentage of
responses within this boundary was calculated. For any critical risk factor where 70% or greater
of the responses were within plus or minus one Likert rating from the median, the factor was
considered to be in consensus of the group. Critical risk factors that fell below this consensus
range of 70% were discard from the final analysis.
Further analysis was performed within subgroups of the participants; specifically, Angels
versus Venture Capitalists (VC’s), to determine if there were differences in ranking of critical
success factors and consensus.
Summary
The methodology described in this chapter provided a framework to determine specific
critical risk factors used heuristically by investors as they make their decisions about which
startup companies to invest in. The research methodology was a three-step Delphi study using a
group of 18 experienced investors to identify a number critical risk factors with a high degree of
consensus. The results allowed the researcher to develop frameworks to assist entrepreneurs in
crafting their company narratives to be more attractive to potential investors and avoid pitfalls
that could result in being declined for investment based on nothing more than a subjective
judgment. Instrumentation for the study included three surveys delivered by the online survey
application Qualtircs and analyzed with the use of Microsoft Excel.
Reliability and validity were achieved through use of an expert panel, carefully
constructed surveys, anonymity of the participants, iteration of the process, and statistical
aggregation of the resultant statistics
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CHAPTER 4
DATA COLLECTION
Introduction
The methodology for data collection and analysis was presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter
4, the process of data collection is presented along with summary data results based on the
various analysis methods outlined for the Delphi research study. In most cases data are
presented using top quartiles for comparative purposes. Full listings of all data results can be
found in the following appendices:


Appendix B – Total Listing of Critical Risk Factors from Survey #1



Appendix C – Full Listing of Survey #2 Results – Unranked



Appendix D – Ranked Consensus Data By Consensus Range



Appendix E – Comparison of Ranked Consensus Data Between Angel Investors and
Venture Capitalists
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this Delphi study was to determine if there is a common set of perceived

critical risk factors among a group of experienced investors that could cause them to reject a deal
out of hand. The Delphi method was appropriate for this study because the information was
uncertain, difficult to quantify, and subject to opinion (Hsu & Standford, 2007; Murray, 1979).
Research Questions
1. To what extent are critical risk factors are involved in the decision-making process of
investors in considering a deal?
2. Which critical risk factors (execution, market, technological, financial, regulatory, etc.)
do investors consider to be common among most investment decisions?
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3. Of these most common categories, what is the relative weight of importance among
them?
4. What differences occur among the critical risk factors between Angel investors and
Venture Capitalists?
Participants and Demographics
For this Delphi Study, 15 participants were chosen as the minimum sample size. In order
to allow for possible attrition, 20 potential participants were recruited for the study. Two
participants failed to complete the survey process leaving 18 participants who were part of the
total Delphi study.
The strength of the Delphi Method is in the expertise of the panelists. The criteria that
were developed for recruiting participants include the following:


A minimum of 5 years experience in investing



A minimum of 10 deals in which they had primary decision-making authority



At least one positive net return

Other criteria applied to the selection of participants included a balanced mix between Venture
Capitalists and Angel Investors.
There were nine Venture Capitalists and nine Angel Investors (Table 4 provides
demographic information about the participants). The group reported total investments of over
$390 million in 745 deals. The Venture Capitalists (VC’s) reported investing $367.7 million in
523 deals for an average of $702,964 per deal, while the Angel Investors (Angels) invested 23.3
million in 222 deals for an average of $104,955 per deal. The average experience of the VC’s
was 16.9 years with a range of 4 to 40 years. The average Angel experience was 13.3 years with
a range of 2 to 30 years. The geographic dispersion of the participants was considered to
represent the best funding opportunities for entrepreneurs across the state of Tennessee. While
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some investors’ home offices were located in other states, principally OH, KY, and CA, all these
investors have conducted business within Tennessee. The locations from which the investors
conducted their investment activities included the following:
Knoxville, TN
Chattanooga, TN
Johnson City, TN
Memphis, TN

Nashville, TN
Johnson City, TN
Greeneville, TN
Bristol, TN

Oak Ridge, TN
Cincinnati, OH
London, KY
San Francisco, CA

Table 4
Participants’ Demographics
Participant

Investor Type

Total Investment

Total Deals

Total Years

1

Venture Capitalist

$25,900,000

85

10

2
3
4

Venture Capitalist
Venture Capitalist
Venture Capitalist

$5,000,000
$250,000,000
$35,000,000

41
150
150

4
33
15

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Total

Venture Capitalist
Venture Capitalist
Venture Capitalist
Venture Capitalist
Venture Capitalist
Angel Investor
Angel Investor
Angel Investor
Angel Investor
Angel Investor
Angel Investor
Angel Investor
Angel Investor
Angel Investor

$50,000,000
$250,000
$1,500,000
*
*
$1,000,000
$2,400,000
$4,400,000
$1,500,000
$500,000
$2,000,000
$6,000,000
$300,000
$5,200,000
$390,950,000

48
10
14
25
*
12
45
11
12
40
15
40
22
25
745

18
10
5.5
40
*
20
17
21
7
30
10
8
2
5
255.5

Note: * indicates participant did not report data.
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Survey Distributions and Response Rate
Survey 1 was the brainstorming stage of the Delphi Method. It identified the critical risk
factors that were important to each investor. Survey 1 was distributed via email to all 20
recruited participants on November 5, 2017. Reminders were sent out on November 9, 2017.
The survey was concluded on November 13, 2017 with 19 responses for a return rate of 95% and
exceeding the minimum threshold of 15.
Survey 2 was the rating stage in the Delphi Study, in which the investors were instructed
to rate the critical risk factors for importance. Survey #2 was distributed via email to 19
participants on November 28, 2017 and the survey was concluded on December 13, 2017. There
were 18 responses for a return rate of 95%.
Survey #3 was the consensus phase of the study whereby the participants reviewed their
responses in context of the group ratings and were allowed to revise their ratings. Survey #3 was
distributed via email to 18 participants on December 19, 2017 and concluded on December 23,
2017. All 18 participants responded for a response rate of 100%.
Survey 1: Construction, Methodology and Response Data
Survey #1 was the brainstorming stage of the Delphi Study (see Appendix A). Following
a brief introduction and the Statement of Informed Consent, participants were asked for some
general demographic information. In the instructions for the survey, the participants were
introduced to the concept of Critical Risk Factors and were instructed to list all the critical risk
factors that come to mind in the investment stages that lead up to Due Diligence. The survey
provided for up to 25 critical risk factors to be listed in an open text field for each. The
participants were provided space to include any quantifiers they felt would clarify their choices.
The 18 participants who responded to Survey 1 returned a total of 193 critical risk factors
for mean of 11 critical risk factors per person. The full listing of critical risk factors as reported
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in the survey appears in Appendix B. The range of responses from participants was 5 to 22 from
each participant (see Figure 3). Most participants responded with between 8 and 14 critical risk
factors.
Upon initial review of the 193 critical risk factors identified by the participants, it was
obvious there were multiple duplicates, although some were worded slightly different. In order
to consolidate the total list of critical risk factors and omit repeats, a set of categories was formed
based on the nature of each response. For example, factors such as trustworthiness and integrity
were categorized as Relationship Factors while amount of investment and valuation were
considered to be Investment and Finance Factors. When Survey 2 was constructed and tested by
the pilot group, it was suggested that the categories made the rating process simpler so the
categories remained as part of the listing of results for Survey 1. As shown in Table 5, once
consolidated and categorized, there were a total of 82 critical risk factors distributed in 7
categories.

Participant Response Rate
22
15
14
13
10
8
7
5
0

1

2

3

Number of Participants

Figure 3. Participant Response Rate
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4

5

Table 5
Critical Risks Factors by Category
Category

Founders and Management Team

Relationship

Market, Competitive Landscape, Scalability
and Early Sales

Critical Risk Factors
Founder’s Experience – Industry
Founder’s Experience – Previous Startups
Founder’s Experience – Leadership
Founder’s Experience – Technical
Founder(s) commitment to startup
Founder’s Experience – Startups
Founder’s Experience – Business Model
Founder’s mindset toward growth
Ability to execute
Perseverance
Founders desirous of liquidation and exit
Open position on management team
Existence and quality of Advisory Board
Strength of the Business Plan
Strategic Metrics and Milestones
Operational execution relative to supply chain
Coachability
Relationship between founders
Transparency
Company/Investor cultural fit
Management ‘skin in the game’
Trustworthiness
Passion
Ethics/Honesty
Integrity
Character
“X” Factor instincts
Total addressable market (size)
Market growth rate
Market segmentation – Consolidated vs.
fractured
Go-to-market strategy
Product/Market fit
Timing in market life cycle
Understanding of market trends
Understanding of competitive landscape
Overall number of competitors
Competitor market share
(continued)
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Table 5 (continued)
Category

Critical Risk Factors

Market, Competitive Landscape, Scalability
and Early Sales (continued)

Ability to scale
Strategy for growth
Scale with minimal capital
Sales strategy
Early traction
Existing revenues
Revenue model

Technology and Value Proposition

Disruptive in the market
“Me Too” technology
Easily copied or reverse engineered
MVP identified and available (Prototype)
Development timeline
Platform technology
Demonstrated customer discovery
Problem, not solution focused
Clear and unique value proposition

Investment and Financial

Amount of investment
Valuation
Follow-on funding needed
Terms
Clean Cap Table
Ability to attract co-investors
Realistic return expectations
M&A Landscape
Investment stage – seed, early growth
Realistic pro forma
Little or no debt
Reasonable burn rate
Projected gross margins
Time to Exit
Potential for good return
Economic conditions favorable for exit
Potential disruptive technology affecting exit
Clean balance sheet
Exit strategy
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Table 5 (continued)
Category

Critical Risk Factors

Regulatory and Legal

No pending or existing litigation
Founder’s need for NDA
Regulatory barriers
Political risks
Existing IP
Competitive advantage
Other barriers to entry

Other Factors

Location of company
“Wow” factor
Intriguing narrative

Survey 2: Construction, Methodology and Response Data
Survey #2 was the rating stage of the Delphi study. When the list of critical risk factors
was determined by the participants, the next step was to have the participants assign importance
ratings to each critical factor. However, upon review of the sheer volume of critical risk factors
yielded by Survey 1, two concerns emerged. The initial expectation of Survey 1 was that there
would be 18 - 24 critical risk factors based on the research reported in the literature review. A
simple Likert type rating scale would be sufficient to differentiate the more important factors
from those less important. Yet, with 82 critical risk factors, the first concern was whether the
participants would be able to distinguish between so many factors. The second concern was
whether there would be enough diversity in a 5-point Importance scale to differentiate a smaller
number of highly important risk factors from the list of 82.
Two proposed solutions were developed. The first was to simply increase the Likert
rating scale from 5 to 10. The second solution was to introduce a matrix type of rating system
that would allow rating along two dimensions. Upon consultation with Dr. Timothy Munyon, a
survey expert at the University of Tennessee, the researcher decided to implement the second
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option. The original 5-point Likert scale was retained as a measure of importance and a 3-point
frequency scale was added. For each critical risk factor, the participants were asked to rate each
critical risk factor using a 5-point scale for importance and a 3-point scale for frequency of use.
Results from this strategy would yield data according to the original intent of the research design,
but would provide additional data in case the results did not have enough diversity to
differentiate a smaller population of the most important risk factors.
Survey 2 was constructed from the results of Survey 1 using the consolidated list of
critical risk factors organized by their respective categories. A copy of the full survey is in
Appendix A. Participants were directed to rate each critical risk factor as follows:
The following definitions correspond to each rating of the importance scale with the
numerical value of the rating in parentheses:






Not Important - This factor is not considered early in the process (1 point)
Minimally Important - This factor is worth mentioning (2 points)
Moderately Important - This factor is considered based on circumstances (3 points)
Important - This factor is usually considered for most cases (4 points)
Critically Important - This factor is a sudden death deal breaker (5 points)

The Frequency of Use scale defined how often the critical risk factor was considered:




Never - I never consider this factor (1 point)
Occasionally - I use this factor from time to time (2 points)
Always - I never make a decision without considering this factor (3 points)

At the conclusion of Survey 2, The Likert scale ratings were converted to corresponding
numerical values using a tool in the Qualtrics survey application. A set of statistical calculations
were applied to the data using Microsoft Excel that included, mean, standard deviation, median,
minimum, and maximum for the data related to the Importance rating. In addition, the numerical
values for the 5-point Importance rating were each multiplied by the 3-point Frequency rating for
a Combined rating in case it proved necessary. A full listing of the data results is included in
Appendix C.
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The data were ranked by mean score in order of highest to lowest and then the listing was
separated into quartiles. The mean data range from the Importance data only was 3.24 to 4.94.
The data range for Importance and Frequency combined was 6.61 to 14.56. Although there were
some differences in actual ranking between the two methods, when analyzed by quartile, there
was only one factor that moved from one quartile to the next. Based on the broad range of mean
values across the population of data, and the minimal impact on quartile placement, it was
determined that mean data for the Importance rating were sufficient for final analysis and in
keeping with the original research methodology. The critical risk factors were ranked by mean
score for Importance in the top two quartiles (see Table 6).
Table 6
Critical Risk Factors Ranked by Mean Values (Top Two Quartiles)
Critical Risk Factors
Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness
Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup
Relationship Factors - Integrity
Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute
Relationship Factors - Coachability
Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance
Relationship Factors - Character
Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage
Relationship Factors - Passion
Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape
Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return
Relationship Factors - Transparency
Market Factors - Product/Market Fit
Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Proposition
Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation
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Mean Value
4.94
4.94
4.89
4.89
4.82
4.82
4.76
4.72
4.71
4.67
4.61
4.61
4.59
4.59
4.56
4.56

Table 6 (continued)
Critical Risk Factors
Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game'
Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale
Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth
Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy
Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model
Investment Factors - Terms
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth
Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype)
Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy
Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed
Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry
Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate
Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused
Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones
Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit
Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth
Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size)
Investment Factors - Valuation
Technology Factors - Development Timeline
Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry
Exit Factors - Exit Strategy
Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP
Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction
Note: Dotted line represents boundary between the 1st and 2nd quartiles

Mean Value
4.50
4.50
4.47
4.39
4.39
4.39
4.35
4.35
4.33
4.29
4.29
4.28
4.27
4.25
4.22
4.18
4.18
4.17
4.17
4.13
4.12
4.11
4.11
4.11
4.06

Among the critical risk factors in the top quartile, two categories emerged more often
than others. The relationship category was the most important with 6 in the top ten, and 8 in the
top quartile. Founders and Management team followed with 3 in the top ten and 5 in the top
quartile. The other categories were fairly well distributed.
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Survey 3: Construction, Methodology and Response Data
Survey 3 was the consensus stage of the Delphi process. The participants were shown
each critical risk factor, along with its calculated median score and the range of median scores
from minimum to maximum. A table was created listing each participant along with their score
for each critical risk factor. The Qualtrics survey application cross-referenced each critical risk
factor with the individual score of each participant from Survey 2, allowing them to compare
their scores with the median and the range of the group. The participants were instructed to
consider their original response in comparison to the median of the group and they were offered
the opportunity to change their score based on this information. They could either stay within
consensus (represented by the median score) or remain outside. It is important to restate that the
participants had no knowledge of who the other participants were and no way of knowing how
anyone else but themselves responded. A copy of Survey 3 is in Appendix A.
Consensus Effect
A total of 57 ratings were changed during Survey 3 for an average of 3.2 per participant.
The number of participants who chose to make changes in their initial ratings as a result of
comparing with the group median and range was well distributed (see Figure 4).
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Number of Participants Making Changes
Number of Participants
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Figure 4. Number of Participants Making Changes
The majority (34) of the changes appeared to change from the participants’ original score
to the median. Eleven changes were made to fill in blanks left in Survey #2. Six changes were
made away from the median and six were made toward the median but not to match it.
Analysis of Consensus
The data from Survey 2 was used to compare the changes in participant responses in
Survey 3. Each response that was a change from the original score was replaced with the new
score. New statistics were calculated and the results were ranked. There were several critical
risk actors that had movement within the ranked list; all of which only moved one or two places
with two exceptions. The critical factor, “Ability to Execute” moved into first position in the top
quartile after the consensus phase. The critical factor, “Demonstrated Customer Discovery”
moved from mid-quartile two up into the first quartile showing the impact of the group
consensus on that one critical risk factor.
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Based on the research methodology developed by Ulschak (1983) who recommended a
criterion of 80 percent of ratings fall with two categories of a seven-point Likert scale as a
measure of consensus; and Green (1982) who suggested that 70 percent should rate at least three
or higher on a four point Likert scale with the median being 3.25 or higher, consensus ranges for
this research were developed based on one Likert score above and one below the median. For a
median score of 5, the consensus range was between 4 and 5. For a median score of 4, the
consensus rage was between 3 and 5. For a median score of 3, the consensus rage was between 2
and 4.
The Importance rating scores for Survey 3 were analyzed against these consensus ranges
and any score that fell outside the range was identified. The number of outside-range scores
were then totaled for each critical risk factor. The research methodology called for identifying
critical risk factors according to the overall consensus of the group of participants based on 70%
of the responses being within the Consensus Range. Based on an analysis of the number of
critical risk factors within the consensus range, three critical risk factors were below 70%
consensus and were discarded from the final ranking. They were Strength of the Business Plan,
Existing Revenues, and Founder’s Need for non-disclosure agreements. Twenty-two critical risk
factors were within 100% consensus of the group (see Table 7). The overall ranked lists for
70%, 80% and 100% consensus are in Appendix D. It should be noted that some deliberation
was given to whether the consensus threshold should be 70% or 80% given there were references
for either method. Upon review of the data, there was only one critical risk factor in the top two
quartiles that was below 80%. Setting the threshold at 80% would have had minimal impact on
the most important factors. Therefore, the threshold of consensus remained at 70% for this
study.
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Table 7
Distribution of Critical Risk Factors Across Range of Consensus
Rate of Consensus

Participants within Range

Critical Risk Factors
within Range

100%

18

22

80 – 99%

15 – 17

44

70 – 80%

13 – 14

13

Below 70%

12 or fewer

3

The final ranking of critical risk factors with at least 70% consensus resulted in 39 factors
in the top two quartiles ranging in importance from 4.1 to 5.0 (see Table 8).
Table 8
Ranking of Critical Risk Factors with at least 70% Consensus
Critical Risk Factors

Mean Value

Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute
Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness
Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup
Relationship Factors - Integrity
Relationship Factors - Coachability
Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance
Relationship Factors - Character
Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage
Relationship Factors - Passion
Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape
Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return
Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game'
Relationship Factors - Transparency
Market Factors - Product/Market Fit
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5
5
4.94
4.89
4.89
4.82
4.76
4.72
4.71
4.67
4.67
4.67
4.61
4.59
4.59

Table 8 (continued)
Critical Risk Factors

Mean Value

Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Proposition
Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation
Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth
Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale
Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery

4.56
4.56
4.53
4.50
4.44

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth
Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy
Investment Factors - Terms
Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy
Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype)
Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed
Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model
Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate
Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry
Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones
Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders
Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit
Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth
Investment Factors - Valuation
Technology Factors - Development Timeline
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry
Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size)
Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table
Note: Dotted line indicates boundary between Quartile #1 and Quartile #2

4.41
4.39
4.39
4.33
4.33
4.29
4.28
4.28
4.28
4.25
4.22
4.18
4.18
4.18
4.17
4.12
4.11
4.11
4.11

Comparing Angel Investors with Venture Capitalists
The final data set from Survey 3 was sorted by “Investor Type” and separated into two
data sets, one for Angel Investors and the other for Venture Capitalists. An analysis of
consensus was performed using the same parameters previously discussed. The number of
participants was evenly split across each Investor Type: nine Angel Investors and nine Venture
Capitalists. The consensus within each group was higher than with the one large group as shown
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in Table 9. The Venture Capitalists had 47 instances of 100% consensus while the Angels had
31. The Angels had nearly three times the number of factors that fell outside consensus than did
the Venture Capitalists.
Table 9
Comparison of Consensus Between Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists
Rate of Consensus

All Participants

Angel Investors

Venture Capitalists

100%

23

31

47

80 – 99%

42

18

21

70 – 80%

13

20

9

Below 70%

4

13

5

The critical risk factors were ranked for each Investor Type based on newly calculated
statistics within each group. The total listings are in Appendix E. The respective listings for the
top quartiles for Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists were compared in Table 10. Although
not identical, the lists are substantially similar in that 12 specific critical risk factors were present
in the top quartile of both lists. However, there were some differences as marked in the table.
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Table 10
Comparison of Final Consensus Rankings
Angel Investor Consensus Final Data

Venture Capitalist Consensus Final Data

Founders and Management - Ability to execute

Founders and Management - Founder(s) commitment

Relationship - Coachability

Founders and Management Team - Ability to execute

Relationship - Trustworthiness

Relationship - Trustworthiness

Relationship - Ethics/Honesty

Founders and Management Team - Perseverance

Relationship - Integrity

Relationship - Ethics/Honesty

Founders and Management - Founder(s) commitment

Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return***

Relationship - Character

Relationship - Company/Investor cultural fit***

Understanding of Competitive Landscape***

Relationship - Management 'skin in the game'

Intellectual Property - Competitive Advantage

Relationship - Integrity

Relationship - Passion

Traction and Revenue - Revenue Model***

Founders and Management - Perseverance

Relationship - Coachability

Relationship – Transparency***

Relationship - Passion

Market - Product/Market Fit***

Relationship - Character

Investment – Terms***

Market - Go-to-market Strategy***

Legal - No Pending or Existing Litigation***

Scaleability - Ability to Scale***

Relationship - Management 'skin in the game'

Scaleability - Strategy for Growth***

Value Proposition - Unique Value Proposition

Value Proposition - Unique Value Proposition
Investment - Follow-on Funding Needed***
Intellectual Property - Competitive Advantage

Note: Fewer critical risk factors appear in the top quartile for Angel Investors because several critical risk
factors were removed because of a lack of consensus between the Angel Investors. To highlight differences,
critical risk factors were marked with triple asterisks (***) to indicate which factors were unique to their
respective lists.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
In Chapter 1 of this study, the purpose was presented, which was to determine if there
were common categories of critical risk factors among a group of investors and to quantify each
category with respect to importance in the decision-making process. The Delphi method was
appropriate for this study because the information was uncertain, difficult to quantify, and
subject to opinion (Hsu & Standford, 2007; Murray, 1979). Chapter 2 set a context for the study
by reviewing the literature, which introduced both objective and subjective methods conveyed by
investors during and after the investment processes. The literature revealed that the investment
process occurs through stages, with more subjective criteria at play in the early stages, and then
more objective measure at the close of a deal. Chapter 3 presented how the Delphi method was
chosen and would be implemented for this study. Chapter 4 presented summaries of the data at
every phase of the Delphi process used in this study.
In Chapter 5, analyses of these data and conclusions are presented with respect to each of
the research questions. A summary of the Delphi approach is presented followed by implications
of this study and recommendations for further research.
Research Questions
1. To what extent are critical risk factors are involved in the decision-making process of
investors in considering a deal?
2. Which critical risk factors (execution, market, technological, financial, regulatory, etc.)
do investors consider to be common among most investment decisions?
3. Of these most common categories, what is the relative weight of importance among
them?
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4. What differences occur among the critical risk factors between Angel investors and
Venture Capitalists?
Conclusions
Research Question 1
A total of 193 critical risk factors were reported by 18 participants for an average of 11
critical risk factors per participant. Although the range of responses was between 5 and 22, most
participants reported between 8 and 14 critical risk factors. It is clear these participants were
aware of certain criteria they are looking for when engaged in the initial stages of a potential
investment. However, judging from the high level of consensus in the consolidated listing of 82
critical risk factors, (only 3 factors were discarded due to a lack of consensus), and the fact that
the top two quartiles rated 4.00 (Important) to 5.00 (Critically Important), there is evidence to
support the idea that there are far more critical risk factors at play in investment decisions than a
mere dozen or so. Even if one considers a consensus threshold of 100%, there were 19 critical
risk factors rated above 4.0.
Investors use their own set of critical risk factors in their decision-making process to a
great extent. This research pointed out that there are more critical risk factors involved with
investors’ decision-making process than came to mind when they were initially asked to list
them.
Research Question 2
With 82 critical risk factors summarized from 18 participant responses and half of them
being rated 4.0 or higher in importance at a high level of consensus, any expectations of a
concise listing of a dozen critical risk factors could not be realized. However, if one analyzes the
top quartile with a consensus threshold of greater than 80%, a manageable answer to this
research question begins to emerge. Of 17 critical risk factors meeting this condition, nearly
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half, or 8 factors are related to relationship including Trustworthiness, Transparency, Ethics,
Integrity, Coachability, Character, and Passion. The top two factors, each with a mean score of
importance of 5 out of 5 are Trustworthiness and Management Ability to Execute. Rounding out
the balance of the list are factors that include Founder Commitment, Perseverance, Competitive
Advantage with Respect to IP, Potential for a Good Return, Product Market Fit, Clear and
Unique Value Proposition, and finally, No Existing Litigation. Surprisingly absent from this
listing are any financial related factors. The Revenue Model shows up as a critical factor well
down in the second quartile with a mean score of 4.44. Clearly relationship based critical risk
factors form the most important and claim the highest consensus as a category of all the other,
more objectively based measures.
Research Question 3
In order to assist in the process of consolidating the 193 responses from Survey 1,
categories were identified which represented critical risk factors of some similarity. Of the
categories in the top two quartiles with a consensus threshold of greater than 70%, there were 10
critical risk factors in the Relationship Category (average mean score: 4.66), followed by 6
factors in each of the Management Team (4.58) and Investment categories (4.19). The category
of Market Factors (4.27), followed with 4 while Scalability (4.45), Value Propsition (4.42), and
Intellectual Property (4.37) each had 3 factors within the category. Rounding out the top ten
categories were Exit, Intellectual Property and Revenue, each with two factors in their respective
categories.
Relationship factors carried the most weight as well as the most factors identified as a
category, followed by Management Team factors, which were reflected in much of the research
literature. It is interesting to note that Scalability Factors ranked next based on average
importance (4.45) even though there were half the number of factors than the Investment
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category. Value Proposition, with 3 factors ranked next in importance with a category mean of
4.42. Factors related to Exit Strategy completed the top five categories with a category mean of
4.39.
What is striking about this analysis is the profound difference of the Relationship
category compared to all the others. The Relationship category consists of the “soft”
characteristics that are typically more subjective such as “Trustworthiness”, “Character”, or
“Integrity”, whereas the other categories can be evaluated typically by some objective measure.
Among all the prior research reviewed, there were studies that focused on one (subjective) or the
other (objective) approach but none were found that combined subjective categories with the
more objective categories. This study placed the two together and Relationship factors rose to
the top of importance among the objectively measured factors.
Research Question 4
The differences between how Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists responded are
significant from a number of perspectives. Looking first at the general rankings of critical risk
factors between the two groups, there were 12 critical factors shared between the two groups. Of
those, 7 were within 3 positions of each other on the ranking scale and the remaining 5 were in
completely different positions within the quartile. Of those remaining, there were 5 factors
unique to the Angle Investors in their top quartile while the Venture Capitalists had 7 unique
critical risk factors in their top quartile. Where there was agreement between the two groups, it
was consistent but the divergences were drastic pointing out that as group, Angel Investors and
Venture Capitalists have different perspectives from each other. The factors unique to the Angel
Investors included Competitive Landscape, Transparency, Product/Market Fit, Investment Terms
and No Existing Litigation. Factors unique to the Venture Capitalists include Return Potential,
Cultural Fit, Revenue Model, Go-to-Market Strategy, Scalability and follow-on Funding.
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The other clear difference between Angel Investors and the Venture Capitalists was the
rate of consensus. As for the number of critical risk factors excluded due to falling below 70%,
the total group discarded three factors, but the Angels excluded 13 while the Venture Capitalists
only excluded 5. Among those critical risk factors rated 100% consensus, the Angel Investors
had only 31 while the Venture Capitalists had 47. In fact, all the critical risk factors in the first
quartile of the Venture Capitalists rated 100% while the Angel Investors only had 9 critical risk
factors rated at 100% consensus in their top quartile. In summary, the Venture Capitalists were
much more aligned as a group than the Angel Investors, and there were distinct differences
among the critical risk factors rated most important between the two groups. This indicated that
Angel Investors tended to think more independently as a group and between each other.
Conclusions Regarding the Delphi Method and the Consensus Effect
The Delphi Method was chosen for this study because the information was uncertain,
difficult to quantify, and subject to opinion (Hsu & Standford, 2007; Murray, 1979). It would
have been much simpler to aggregate a comprehensive list of critical risk factors from other
studies and engage a population of investors to rate them on relative importance. But that method
would have potentially excluded critical risk factors not discovered by those researchers. This
was evidenced in the results of Survey 1. When asked the open-ended question, “Please list all
the critical risk factors you look for when evaluating a potential investment deal,” the
participants responded with anywhere from 5 to 22 responses for a total of 193 responses. After
the ranking process of Survey 2, it was clear they valued more critical risk factors as important
than what came to mind during the brainstorming in Survey 1. Over 40 of the critical risk factors
in the top two quartiles were rated between 4.0 (Important) and 5.0 (Critically Important). The
consensus of these ratings almost doubles the highest number of critical risk factors envisioned
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by any individual alone. Clearly, as a group, these investors identified more important risk
factors than they came up with individually.
The consensus phase of Survey 3 had a direct influence on the individual participants in
more than one respect. First, a number of responses in Survey 2 were left blank for reasons
known only to the participants. When given the opportunity to review the data a second time,
there were 11 cases where previously blank ratings were filled in. In 34 cases, the original rating
for the participant was changed to match the median score. Out of a total of 1,476 individual
responses, 4% (57) rankings were changed as a result of reflection on the group responses. But
this belies another effect of consensus at the Investor Type level, especially among the Angel
Investors who excluded 13 of 82 critical risk factors (18%) as a result of the consensus phase of
the study.
The consensus scores for each critical risk factor underscored the importance rating,
especially for those factors where there was 100% consensus. One can be sure that Political
Risks with an importance rating of 3.3 was significantly less important to the investor than
Trustworthiness, which was rated a perfect 5.0, each at 100% consensus.
In summary, the investors were more creative as a group and within their respective
Investor Types than they were as individuals and their collective, consensus-forming
collaboration underscored the validity of the importance ratings they determined.
Implications of the Study
At least three participants are active in Angel Capital Groups, which are groups of Angel
Investors who come together to review and evaluate potential deals. These individuals are
interested, not only in the results of this study as it might pertain to their own groups, but they
may be interested in conducting Delphi studies of their own within their groups.
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For this group of investors, the impact of this survey could assist them in gaining a better
understanding of how decisions are made within the group, allowing them to place more weight
on those factors seen as more critical to the investment process than others. For individual
investors, this research will provide an evidence based framework for them to compare their own
decision-making process. The fact that the Relationship based factors proved to be more
important than objectively measured factors, coupled with the finding that these two types of
factors are in play at the same time, shows the complexity of decision making in early stage
investments, which cannot be distilled into a simple checklist for the benefit of either investor or
entrepreneur. This research does provide some definition to this complexity. The relative high
degree of consensus within the most important factors may bring confidence to individual
investors that their experience is confirmed by their peers and affords them an opportunity to
review their biases in light of how they rate against their peers.
Unfortunately, for entrepreneurs, this study did not result in a concise, 5-point checklist
or framework they can use to help guarantee they secure an investment. Despite any clarity this
study brings to the process, there will still be a fraction of funding resources available to all who
are seeking it. Investors will still have to decide to decline far more investment deals than they
will close. But what this study does for entrepreneurs is document how complex the process is,
with all the variables that come into play. The consensus effect underscored this reality and
should provide a more realistic alternative to all the Top Ten Things Investors Look For that
show up in ubiquitous blogs on the subject. The other implication for entrepreneurs is the fact
that there are dual/parallel tracks of critical risk factors at play: those related to relationship and
those related to more objective, measurable factors. Much attention is currently given to
constructing financial statements and business models, backed by market research, founder’s
experience and technology. Relationships take time to build, which helps in part to explain why
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invest deals take such a long time. This research suggests that among all the capabilities and
personality traits ascribed to entrepreneurs, yet another, very important skill must be developed
by the CEO of entrepreneurial startups, and this is the ability to form strong relationships over
time with those who have the financial capital to help grow the company.
For instructors, advisors, and coaches of entrepreneurs (as well as entrepreneurs
themselves), this study identified seven major categories and up to a dozen sub-categories that
could be used to develop a framework to begin tackling the task of teaching how investors make
their decisions.
One remaining fact that challenges the findings of this research is that most startups have
to find a way to grow without the funding from equity investors; either through self-funding or
organic growth from reinvesting proceeds from the business. In other words, most startups will
never engage with investors. However, the implications for these businesses, although subtle,
are quite relevant. Investors are interested in a substantial return on investment and this research
categorized a complex set of factors, any of which could render the investment opportunity
worthless should the perceived risk outweigh the potential returns. Investors are interested in
what will add value to a new venture and enable it to grow, which are two conditions that should
be of vital importance to the CEO of a startup company. Investors see hundreds of deals and
evaluate them quickly against this complex set of risk criteria. This research has shown these
criteria have a high level of consensus among a diverse set of investors. This cumulative
expertise suggests that what is good for the investor is good for the entrepreneur and vice versa.
Entrepreneurs, and those who advise and teach them, would do well to consider and apply the
risk factors identified in this research as a measure of overall risk to the business, regardless of
their need to raise equity based capital. A company that is in a good position to raise money,
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should they need it, is better off than one that needs funding and cannot attract it due to a high
perceived level of risk.
Recommendations for Further Research
This study was conducted with participants primarily from Tennessee, although the group
included one from Kentucky, two from Ohio and one from California. One cannot assume these
findings apply to other geographic locations. Entrepreneurial ecosystems across different regions
are often influenced by past successes in specific industries. Successful entrepreneurs may
become investors in other startups as a way to give back, as well as increase their personal
fortunes, and they tend to invest in business similar to those they have experience. For that
reason alone, one should conclude there are potentially different critical risk factors at play in
different geographical regions. For example, a region where medical devices and drug discovery
are common might render more importance to regulatory and legal factors than the participants
for this study. In regions where equity capital is abundant, investors may have higher risk
tolerances than in regions where capital is scarcer.
A recommendation for further study would be to replicate this Delphi study across
different regions to identify common critical risk factors across a broader geography. The
research technique could be applied within homogenous groups like Angel Funds and Investment
Groups to determine if there are specific factors important to the group as a whole.
The 82 critical risk factors identified in this study could be tested in a quantitative study
across a large geographical region through a nationwide member-based organization such as the
Angel Capital Association or the National Venture Capital Association to correlate more
demographic criteria with relative importance of the critical risk factors. This would determine
if there are differences in how investors view risk based on geography, economy, and industry
sectors in different regions of the US.
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Of the objective based critical risk factors reveled in this research, many if not most have
a range of measure within each criterion. For example, Return Potential is a factor that could be
measured in dollars or percentage or multiples of return. This research did not determine the
boundaries of those ranges for critical risk factors that can be measured numerically. It would be
useful to know if Angel Investors’ expectations for return differ from those of Venture
Capitalists. Further research could identify the ranges of expectation among the numerically
measurable critical risk factors.
Of those critical risk factors that are more subjective, especially among the Relationship
category, there is little known about how, or even if these factors can be quantified in any way.
Trustworthiness is important but just how investors evaluate this factor would be a topic for
further qualitative research. The list of Relationship based critical risk factors could be studied
qualitatively to more deeply understand what investors are looking for as they build relationship
in potential investment deals
Another recommendation for further study is to perform higher level statistically based
consensus analyses on this data set to look for correlations. Of particular interest would be to
investigate the interplay between relationship and non-relationship factors. Finally, a qualitative
debrief of the participants in this study might reveal additional relevance in the use of the Delphi
Method for this kind of research.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Delphi Surveys
Qualtrics Survey Software

https://utk.co1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSur...

Default Question Block

Thank you for participating in this research project. This study is the subject of a dissertation in
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education from East Tennessee State
University. I hope you will ﬁnd this process enjoyable and informative. This survey is in three basic
parts.
The ﬁrst is the compulsory Statement of Informed Consent, which is typical with any academic
research project where participants are involved.
The second part is some very basic demographic information, which will be held strictly
conﬁdential and used to understand trends and categories in the analysis phase of the project.
The third part is a basic open survey question.
The entire survey should take 10 - 15 minutes.
When you are ready, click on the orange arrow box to continue.

1 of 7

10/9/17, 9:37 PM
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Qualtrics Survey Software

https://utk.co1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetS...

Default Question Block

Welcome to Survey #2.
In this survey, you will see a comprehensive listing of all the responses from all participants. Every effort was made to
carefully consolidate this list by combining obvious duplicates. In some cases certain terms were interpreted to mean
the same; such as Total Addressable Market, Market Size, Market sufficient to achieve scale, etc. Your efforts produced
a very impressive set of critical risk factors as you will see.
Your task now is to rate each critical risk factor based on its importance to you.
For your convenience, the critical risk factors have been arranged in categories. As you prepare for this survey, please
keep these things in mind:
Consider and rate the factors you commonly use early in the investment process, during the time
prior to due dilligence, when you are forming relationships. These should be things that come up
during presentations, conversations and early meetings.
Go with your immediate first reaction. Do not try to over-analyze a factor. Your first impression is
usually indicitive of your judgement.
This list far exceeds the total number of any individual's responses. If you see a response you did not mention in
Survey #1 but would like to rate it, please do so.
But, do not feel you have to rate every response as important.
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Qualtrics Survey Software

https://utk.co1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSu...

Default Question Block

Welcome to Survey #3.
This is the Consensus phase of the Delphi process. In this 3rd and final survey, you have the
opportunity to see your responses to Survey #2 and compare them to how the rest of the participants
responded as a group to each critical risk factor. For each factor, you will see the median score, the
range, and your score. You may consider your response within the range of the group and you have
the opportunity to change your score if you choose to do so. The analysis of this phase will
determine the group consensus of the most important critical risk factors.
The median is the middle value of all the responses of the group. For example in the following range
of numbers, the median is 4 and the range is 3 - 5:
3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5
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Appendix B: Total Listing of Critical Risk Factors from Survey #1

Founders Experience

Reasonable deal structure, including pre‐money

Intellectual Property

Understanding of market and competitors

Total Addressable Market

Reasonable financial projections

# of competitors, fractured market

Reasonable stated meterics that will lead to new funding round

Regulatory hurdles

Advisors working with the company

Time to market

Early traction in the market

Exit strategies

Does company have a reasonable burn rate

Time to exit

Trustworthiness

Ability to scale

Management team willingness to take advice

How much investment

Realistic growth potential of investment

Can we attract co‐investors
Could Google destroy us with 50 engineers in a room for a
month

Competitive risks

Other team members needed

Understanding of the product/service

when will we know if this will succeed or fail

Ability of founder/CEO to communicate

Growth mindset of founders

Amount of my time/additional investment required

Relationship between founders

Ability to execute or past performance to benchmarks

Source of investment

Ability to build team

Motivation of founders to work on startup

CEO's ability to sell "ice cream to eskimos"

Focus on problem, not solution

Clearly identified customer/market problem

The Entrepreneur ‐

Solution well defined that fits a specific market need

Is the entrepreneur investing in the proposed deal

Large, growing market

Quality of management team

Clear value proposition for customer that compels a purchase

Quality of the proposed deal

Intellectual property

how doe it fit in the proposed market place

Management team who is committed w/skin in the game

who is competion

Good assessment of competition + defined way to successfully compete

what is size of the individual competitior

unique idea

marketing strategy

validated customers

sales strategy

compelling value proposition

plan to scale up the proposed business

big achievable market

How realistic is Business Plan with Pro Forma Financials

competent, experienced, engaging founder, leader

Did entrepreneur prepare the Business Plan

well rounded, COACHABLE management team

Can entrepreneur fluently discuss the Business Plan

revenue/traction

What is proposed exit strategy

"reasonable", defensible valuation

How long will money be invested before proposed exit

smart raise amount and terms

market risk

exciting exit potential

team

Debt load

industry expertise

Management experience/prior success

Resources contributed by founder/CEO
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total cash needed

Product sector and likelihood of success

competition

Comparison of cultures

technology risk

Extent to which management is organized and has a plan

Stage of Startup

macro trends of the market being entered

Industry Sector

technical co‐founder assuming it's a tech enabled business

Location

leadership experiences of the founder

Addressable Market

is the founder coachable?

Foundational Team

reality check w/ the founder of the difficult task ahead

Advisory Board

customer discovery that has taken place

Revenue

future capital needed

Debt
Board Observer and Information Rights Required Regardless of
Investment Level

competitive landscape
Perceived Integrity and Trustworthiness of the team

Founders Open to and Desirous of Liquidation Event

Experience or lack of experience of the team

Founders do Not Require NDA

Is this an app with all revenue derived from advertising

Logical "Go to Market" Strategy

Is this a "me too" investment or a true innovation

Focused Product or Services Offering
Clean BS with "Accredited Investors"

What is expected capital required to scale?
Does the initial presentation demonstrate a fundamental
understanding of the market?

No Third Party Brokers or Intermediaries

Is the valuation reasonable?

Team is Coachable

Single founder vs. team?

No Litigation in Process
Valuation

market size is sufficient to achieve scale
Does the company have a feature or is it capable of being a
complete business?

Transparent Management Discussions

Experience of the founder

Minimal Regulation

Valuation

Must be Scalable with Minimal Capital

Deal terms

Prefer MVP Product Already Developed

Product‐market fit and supporting data, especially sales

Industry knowledge of the venture

Size of addressable market

Understanding of the Risks

Proprietary position/competitive advantage

Entrepreneurial experience

Management team

Intriguing narraative

Location

Disruptive idea or technology

Experience of the founder

Passion for the project
Entrepreneur Risk 1: Will they stick with it when going gets
tough?

Valuation

Entrepreneur Risk 2: Do they have experience in the industry?
Market Risk 1: Does anyone want the product? Are they really
solving a problem?

Product‐market fit and supporting data, especially sales

Deal terms

Size of addressable market

Technology/Product Risk: Can they build the product?
Defensibility: If they get traction, can they keep out
competitive pressures?

Proprietary position/competitive advantage

Timing Risk: Is it too early? Too late?

Location

Entrepreneur Risk 3: Can they lead and recruit a team?

Execution Risk ‐‐ Experience with Start‐Ups

Management team
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Entrepreneur Risk 4: Can they execute?

Execution Risk ‐‐ Experience with Business Model

Market Size: Is the market big enough to grow?

Execution Risk ‐‐ Experience with Industry

Market Risk 2: Market competition

Execution Risk ‐‐ Experience with Company Leadership

Market Risk 3: Political/Regulatory risks

Execution Risk ‐‐ Skin in the Game

Exit Risk: How will we see our return? Exit/dividend, etc.?

Execution Risk ‐‐ Character of Principals

Stage Risk: Is it too early to invest?
Business Model Risk: Will people pay what entrepreneur
thinks?

Execution Risk ‐‐ "X" Factor Instinct

Technology, product, or industry I don't understand

Market Risk ‐‐ Product/Service

Exit strategy is unclear

Market Risk ‐‐ Marcoeconomic

Experience level or track record of entrepreneur

Technology/Innovation Risk

Ethics or honesty concerns with entrepreneur

Compeititve risk

Fundamental concerns with business plan

Market Risk ‐‐ Business Model

Intellectual property position

Financial risk ‐‐ Long term

Limited market

Financial risk ‐‐ Current raise

Inadequate funding to reach next milestone

Supply chain risk ‐‐ production

Known business problem is being solved

Supply chain risk ‐‐ marcoeconomic

Reasonable stated value proposition offerred to customers

Market Risk ‐‐ Value proposition

Reasonable managment team in place depending on stage

Financial risk ‐‐ profitability

Reasonable overall market opportunity

Exit risk ‐‐ Strategy

Appropriate IP protection; barriers to entry

Exit risk ‐‐ Marco

Great leader in place

Exit Risk ‐‐ Technology/Innovation

Market Risk ‐‐ Value Proposition

Reasonable MVP available
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Appendix C: Full Listing of Survey #2 Results – Unranked
Imp. +
Frequency
11.22

Importance
4.11

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Previous Startups

8.39

3.76

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Leadership

9.89

3.89

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience -Technical

8.61

3.44

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup

14.39

4.89

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Startups

8.78

3.5

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Business Model

9.06

3.65

11.72

4.35

13.5

4.82

12.83

4.76

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of liquidation and exit

9.47

3.83

Founders and Management Team Factors - Open positions on management team

7.11

3.29

Founders and Management Team Factors - Existence and quality of Advisory Board

7.33

3.28

Founders and Management Team Factors - Strength of Business Plan

8.61

3.39

11.22

4.22

6.61

3.24

Relationship Factors - Coachability

13.22

4.82

Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders

10.39

4.12

Relationship Factors - Transparency

12.39

4.59

Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit

10.17

4.18

Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game'

12.17

4.5

Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness

14.56

4.94

Relationship Factors - Passion

13.11

4.67

Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty

14.33

4.94

Relationship Factors - Integrity

14.44

4.89

Relationship Factors - Character

13.56

4.72

7.94

3.63

11.67

4.17

Market Factors - Market Growth Rate

9.56

3.82

Market Factors - Market Segmentation - Consolidated vs. Fractured

7.83

3.47

12.72

4.39

Market Factors - Product/Market Fit

12.5

4.59

Market Factors - Timing in Market Life Cycle

9.22

3.71

Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends

8.78

4

13.39

4.61

8.5

3.47

8.56

3.65

Critical Risk Factor
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth
Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute
Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance

Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones
Founders and Management Team Factors - Operational execution relative to supply chain

Relationship Factors - "X" Factor Instincts
Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size)

Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy

Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape
Competitive Factors - Overall Number of Competitors
Competitive Factors - Competitor Market Share
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Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale

12.39

4.5

Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth

11.61

4.47

9.06

3.71

Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy

11.61

4.33

Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction

10.61

4.06

7.83

3.35

Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model

12.67

4.39

Technology Factors - Disruptive in the Market

8.89

3.65

Technology Factors - "Me too" Technology

7.22

3.4

Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engineered

9.39

3.72

Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype)

11

4.35

Technology Factors - Development Timeline

9.5

4.13

8.67

3.82

10.44

4.25

9.67

4.27

12.83

4.56

9.17

3.71

Investment Factors - Valuation

11.44

4.17

Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed

11.61

4.29

12

4.39

10.11

4.06

Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors

9.78

3.83

Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations

10.33

4

6.83

3.29

11.28

4.18

Financial Factors - Realistic Pro Forma

9.33

3.76

Financial Factors - Little or No Debt

8.28

3.53

Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate

11.78

4.28

Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins

10.22

3.89

9.33

3.82

Exit Factors - Exit Strategy

11.33

4.11

Exit Factors - Time to Exit

9.39

3.83

13.67

4.61

Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit

8.56

3.71

Exit Factors - Potential Disruptive Technology Affecting Exit

6.94

3.53

12.44

4.56

Legal Factors - Founder's Need for NDA

7.11

3.28

Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers

9.39

4

Regulatory Factors - Political Risks

7.33

3.39

Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP

10.17

4.11

Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage

12.89

4.71

Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital

Traction and Revenue Factors - Existing Revenues

Technology Factors - Platform Technology
Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery
Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused
Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Propostion
Investment Factors - Amount of Investment

Investment Factors - Terms
Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table

Investment Factors - M&A Landscape
Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth

Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet

Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return

Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation
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Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry

10.44

4.29

Other Factors - Location of Company

8.33

3.47

Other Factors - Wow Factor

6.94

3.25

Other Factors - Intriguing Narrative

8.39

3.81
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Appendix D: Ranked Consensus Data by Consensus Range
Ranked Consensus Data > 70%
94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty

4.94

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup

4.89

100%

Relationship Factors - Integrity

4.89

94%

Relationship Factors - Coachability

4.82

94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance

4.76

94%

Relationship Factors - Character

4.72

94%

Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage

4.71

100%

Relationship Factors - Passion

4.67

100%

Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape

4.67

Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return

4.67

Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game'

4.61

94%

Relationship Factors - Transparency

4.59

94%

Market Factors - Product/Market Fit

4.59

94%

Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Propostion

4.56

89%

Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation

4.56

89%

Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth

4.53

94%

Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale

4.50

94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth

4.47

89%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model

4.44

78%

Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery

4.44

100%

Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy

4.39

100%

Investment Factors - Terms

4.39

100%

Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy

4.33

100%

Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype)

4.33

Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed

4.29

100%

Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate

4.28

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry

4.28

Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused

4.25

Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones

4.22

94%

Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders

4.18

83%

Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit

4.18

89%

Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth

4.18

94%

Investment Factors - Valuation

4.17

94%

Technology Factors - Development Timeline

4.12

94%
100%

89%

94%
100%
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100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry

4.11

100%

Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size)

4.11

Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table

4.11

100%

Exit Factors - Exit Strategy

4.11

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP

4.11

94%

Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends

4.00

89%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction

4.00

89%

Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations

4.00

100%

Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers

4.00

100%

Technology Factors - Platform Technology

3.94

100%

Exit Factors - Time to Exit

3.94

89%

Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet

3.94

89%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Leadership

3.89

89%

Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engioneered

3.89

94%

Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins

3.89

94%

Market Factors - Market Growth Rate

3.88

94%

Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors

3.83

83%

Financial Factors - Realistic Pro Forma

3.82

83%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of liquidation and exit

3.78

94%

Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit

3.76

83%

Other Factors - Intriguing Narrative

3.76

83%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Previous Startups

3.71

78%

Market Factors - Timing in Market Life Cycle

3.71

89%

Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital

3.71

78%

Investment Factors - Amount of Investment

3.71

78%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Business Model

3.65

78%

Competitive Factors - Competitor Market Share

3.65

78%

Technology Factors - Disruptive in the Market

3.65

83%

Financial Factors - Little or No Debt

3.65

72%

Exit Factors - Potential Disruptive Technology Affecting Exit

3.56

72%

Relationship Factors - "X" Factor Instincts

3.53

78%

Technology Factors - "Me too" Technology

3.53

78%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Startups

3.50

89%

Market Factors - Market Segmentation - Consolidated vs. Fractured

3.47

83%

Other Factors - Location of Company

3.47

94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience -Technical

3.44

72%

Competitive Factors - Overall Number of Competitors

3.41

Regulatory Factors - Political Risks

3.33

89%

Investment Factors - M&A Landscape

3.29

89%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Existence and quality of Advisory Board

3.28

94%

100%
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94%
72%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Open positions on management team
Founders and Management Team Factors - Operational execution relative to supply
chain

3.24
3.24

78%

Other Factors - Wow Factor

3.18

Ranked Consensus Data > 80%
94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty

4.94

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup

4.89

100%

Relationship Factors - Integrity

4.89

94%

Relationship Factors - Coachability

4.82

94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance

4.76

94%

Relationship Factors - Character

4.72

94%

Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage

4.71

100%

Relationship Factors - Passion

4.67

100%

Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape

4.67

Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return

4.67

Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game'

4.61

94%

Relationship Factors - Transparency

4.59

94%

Market Factors - Product/Market Fit

4.59

94%

Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Propostion

4.56

89%

Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation

4.56

89%

Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth

4.53

94%

Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale

4.50

94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth

4.47

89%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model

4.44

100%

Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy

4.39

100%

Investment Factors - Terms

4.39

100%

Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy

4.33

100%

Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype)

4.33

Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed

4.29

100%

Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate

4.28

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry

4.28

Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused

4.25

Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones

4.22

94%

Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders

4.18

83%

Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit

4.18

89%

Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth

4.18

94%
100%

89%

94%
100%
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94%

Investment Factors - Valuation

4.17

94%

Technology Factors - Development Timeline

4.12

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry

4.11

100%

Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size)

4.11

Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table

4.11

100%

Exit Factors - Exit Strategy

4.11

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP

4.11

94%

Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends

4.00

89%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction

4.00

89%

Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations

4.00

100%

Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers

4.00

100%

Technology Factors - Platform Technology

3.94

100%

Exit Factors - Time to Exit

3.94

89%

Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet

3.94

89%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Leadership

3.89

89%

Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engioneered

3.89

94%

Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins

3.89

94%

Market Factors - Market Growth Rate

3.88

94%

Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors

3.83

83%

3.82

83%

Financial Factors - Realistic Pro Forma
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of liquidation and
exit

94%

Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit

3.76

83%

3.76

83%

Other Factors - Intriguing Narrative
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Previous
Startups

3.71

89%

Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital

3.71

83%

Financial Factors - Little or No Debt

3.65

89%

Market Factors - Market Segmentation - Consolidated vs. Fractured

3.47

83%

Other Factors - Location of Company

3.47

94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience -Technical

3.44

Regulatory Factors - Political Risks

3.33
3.29

89%

Investment Factors - M&A Landscape
Founders and Management Team Factors - Existence and quality of Advisory
Board

3.28

94%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Open positions on management team

3.24

94%

100%
89%
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3.78

Ranked Consensus Data = 100%
100%

Relationship Factors – Trustworthiness

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to
startup

4.94
4.89

100%

Relationship Factors – Integrity

4.89

100%

Relationship Factors – Passion

4.67

100%

Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape

4.67

100%

100%

Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game'

4.61

100%

Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy

4.39

100%

Investment Factors – Terms

4.39

100%

Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy

4.33

100%

Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype)

4.33

100%

Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate

4.28

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry

4.28

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones

4.22

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry

4.11

100%

Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size)

4.11

100%

Exit Factors - Exit Strategy

4.11

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP

4.11

100%

Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers

4.00

100%

Technology Factors - Platform Technology

3.94

100%

Exit Factors - Time to Exit

3.94

100%

Regulatory Factors - Political Risks

3.33

128

Appendix E: Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists
Angel Investor Consensus Final Data

Venture Capitalist Consensus Final Data

89%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute

5.00

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup

5.00

89%

Relationship Factors - Coachability

5.00

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty

5.00

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance

4.89

100%

5.00

100%

Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty

4.89

100%

Relationship Factors - Integrity
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s)
commitment to startup

4.78

100%

Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return

4.89

100%

Relationship Factors - Character

4.78

100%

Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit

4.78

100%

Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape

4.78

100%

Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game'

4.78

Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage

4.75

100%

Relationship Factors - Integrity

4.78

Relationship Factors - Passion

4.67

100%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model

4.78

89%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance

4.63

100%

Relationship Factors - Coachability

4.67

89%

Relationship Factors - Transparency

4.63

100%

Relationship Factors - Passion

4.67

89%

Market Factors - Product/Market Fit

4.63

100%

Relationship Factors - Character

4.67

Investment Factors - Terms

4.56

100%

Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy

4.67

Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation

4.56

100%

Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale

4.67

Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game'

4.44

100%

Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth

4.67

89%

Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Proposition

4.44

100%

Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Propostion

4.67

89%

Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return

4.44

100%

Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed

4.67

78%

Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth

4.38

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage

4.67

89%

Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale

4.33

89%

Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery

4.63

89%

Investment Factors - Valuation

4.33

89%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth

4.56

100%

Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations

4.22

89%

Relationship Factors - Transparency

4.56

100%

4.22

100%

Market Factors - Product/Market Fit

4.56

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience Industry

4.11

100%

Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape

4.56

100%

Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size)

4.11

100%

Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy

4.56

100%

Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy

4.11

100%

Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype)

4.56

100%

Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy

4.11

89%

Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation

4.56

100%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model

4.11

89%

Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused

4.50

100%

Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype)

4.11

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones

4.44

100%

Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate

4.11

89%

Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders

4.44

100%

Exit Factors - Exit Strategy

4.11

89%

Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth

4.44

100%

4.11

100%

Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate

4.44

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and
Milestones

4.00

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry

4.44

100%

Technology Factors - Platform Technology

4.00

100%

Technology Factors - Development Timeline

4.33

100%

Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused

4.00

100%

Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers

4.33

100%

Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table

4.00

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Leadership

4.22

100%

Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins

3.89

100%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction

4.22

78%
100%

100%
89%
100%
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89%

Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders

3.88

100%

Investment Factors - Terms

4.22

89%

Market Factors - Market Growth Rate

3.88

89%

Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table

4.22

89%

Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends

3.88

100%

Exit Factors - Time to Exit

4.22

89%

Technology Factors - Development Timeline

3.88

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry

4.11

78%

Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed

3.88

100%

Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size)

4.11

78%

3.88

100%

Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends

4.11

3.78

89%

Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet

4.11

78%

Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience Previous Startups
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of
liquidation and exit

3.78

100%

Exit Factors - Exit Strategy

4.11

89%

Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engioneered

3.78

89%

Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engioneered

4.00

Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors

3.78

100%

Investment Factors - Valuation

4.00

78%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction

3.75

100%

Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP

4.00

89%

Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet

3.75

100%

Other Factors - Intriguing Narrative

4.00

100%

Exit Factors - Time to Exit

3.67

100%

Market Factors - Market Growth Rate

3.89

100%

3.67

89%

Competitive Factors - Competitor Market Share

3.89

78%

Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience Business Model

3.63

89%

Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital

3.89

78%

Market Factors - Timing in Market Life Cycle

3.63

100%

Technology Factors - Platform Technology

3.89

78%

Technology Factors - Disruptive in the Market

3.63

89%

Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors

3.89

78%

Investment Factors - Amount of Investment

3.63

100%

Financial Factors - Realistic Pro Forma

3.89

78%

Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit

3.63

89%

Financial Factors - Little or No Debt

3.89

78%

Exit Factors - Potential Disruptive Technology Affecting Exit
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience Leadership
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience Technical
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience Startups

3.63

89%

Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins

3.89

3.63

100%

Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit

3.89

3.56

89%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of liquidation

3.78

3.56

78%

Market Factors - Timing in Market Life Cycle

3.78

3.50

78%

Traction and Revenue Factors - Existing Revenues

3.78

100%

100%

78%
100%
78%
78%

3.50

78%

Investment Factors - Amount of Investment

3.78

78%

Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strength of Business
Plan
Market Factors - Market Segmentation - Consolidated vs.
Fractured

3.44

78%

3.78

78%

Investment Factors - M&A Landscape

3.38

78%

Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Business
Model

3.67

89%

Financial Factors - Little or No Debt
Founders and Management Team Factors - Open positions on
management team
Founders and Management Team Factors - Existence and quality
of Advisory Board

3.38

78%

Technology Factors - Disruptive in the Market

3.67

3.33

89%

Regulatory Factors - Political Risks

3.67

3.25

89%

Other Factors - Location of Company

3.67

Regulatory Factors - Political Risks

3.00

78%

Relationship Factors - "X" Factor Instincts

3.56

Traction and Revenue Factors - Existing Revenues

2.88

100%

Market Factors - Market Segmentation - Consolidated vs. Fractured

3.56

2.75

89%

Competitive Factors - Overall Number of Competitors

3.56

78%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Startups

3.44

78%

Technology Factors - "Me too" Technology

3.44

89%

Other Factors - Wow Factor

3.44

Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience Technical
Founders and Management Team Factors - Existence and quality of Advisory
Board

3.33
3.33

100%

Founders and Management Team Factors - Open positions on Mgmt. team

3.22

100%

Investment Factors - M&A Landscape

3.22

78%

89%
78%
100%
78%

100%
89%
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